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Abstract
This article explores new forms of policing in New York, Chicago, and Boston. These cities
developed new policing strategies that each involves a different combination of problem solving
and new forms of “community policing”. The article explores whether these developments re-
sulted in crime reduction and changes in belief in the efﬁcacy of policing. The article concludes
by considering the costs of the resulting increased security - reduction in democratic control of
policing and increased risk to civil liberties.
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Philip B. Heymann*
The  purpose of this article  is  to examine  a remarkable  develop-
ment in law enforcement:  the exploration of new forms of policing
by  combinations  of police  leaders  and  academics.  This  examina-
tion focuses  on three major cities-New York,  Chicago,  and Bos-
ton-that  have  developed  three  different  combinations  of
problem-solving  and  new  forms  of  relationships  with  neighbor-
hoods that  are often called  "community  policing."  As  a result  of
these immense undertakings, we have seen a change in belief in the
efficacy of policing.  But the changed attitudes towards police func-
tions are  accompanied  by  certain risks.
I.  THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF THE NEW  POLICING
I will begin by describing the weaknesses  and the strengths of the
argument that  new  forms  of policing  have  had  a major  effect  on
fear and safety in our cities and, through that, on the quality of life
for millions of people.  But wholly  aside from  the  amount of  evi-
dence for this belief, it exists and that in turn has changed the atti-
tudes toward policing  of citizens  and political  leaders  alike.
It is  important to  look at New York, Chicago, and Boston sepa-
rately, for they represent somewhat different approaches  based on
different theories  supported by  different police leaders  and  schol-
ars.  Their apparent successes explain the change in attitude toward
police,  but  the  approaches  differ  along  the  two  dimensions  that
many  consider  most  important:  reduction  of crime  and  disorder
and  an increase in trust in the police.
I will describe generally the practices  and  theories of policing in
each  of these  three  cities  and  provide  some  evidence  as  to  what
each is doing better or worse.  But then it is worth departing  from
the broad models, each of which may hide too much that is impor-
tant and particular under a single theory that seems  almost as copi-
ous as an ideology.  We should look much harder at the underlying
operations  of  each  cities'  police  department.  And,  finally,  we
should  consider  the  values  affected  by,  and  the  risks  associated
with, the different  forms of policing.
*  Philip B. Heymann  is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard  Law
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A.  The National  Decline  in Crime
Before turning to the changes in theory and practice  of policing
and their consequences,  we should note the importance of the new
belief that policing can make a big difference  in the amount of vio-
lent crime,  property crime,  and troublesome  disorder.  In focusing
on the new belief, I am not trying to raise doubts about the reduc-
tion in fear and the increase  in safety that have occurred through-
out the United States.  There may be some questions as to the role
of policing  in  bringing this  about-though  these questions  do not
trouble  most  of  our  politicians  and  citizens-but  there  is  little
doubt about the fact  of these  changes,  particularly the  actual and
significant  reduction  in  fear and increase  in safety  in most  places
throughout  the United  States  and  particularly in two of the cities
which we will be examining.
Figures on  reported  crime  and  surveys  of citizens  tell  identical
stories.  After  a  rapid  increase  during  the  1960s,  there  was  long-
term stability in crime rates in the United States during the follow-
ing quarter century.'  That stability included a homicide  rate in the
United States that was three or four times  as high as those of other
Western democracies.2  It was  also widely believed that non-lethal
violent  crime  greatly  exceeded  that  of  comparably  advanced
countries.3
Within  this long-term  trend, something dramatic first happened
in the mid-1980s  when the  amount of youth  violence, particularly
killing, shot up dramatically, while  violence  by those over twenty-
five was declining.  Then, in the early 1990s, the direction of change
reversed and for the rest of the twentieth century, crime,  including
violent crime, declined radically to levels we had not seen since the
1960s.
4  Arrests of males under age eighteen for violent crimes de-
clined 26%  between  1994 and 1999.5  The  trend has continued into
1.  BUREAU  OF JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP'T OF JUSTICE,  HOMICIDE  TRENDS
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  §  2  (2000),  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/hmrt.htm
[hereinafter  HOMICIDE  TRENDS].
2.  OFFICE  FOR  DRUG  CONTROL  &  CRIME  PREVENTION,  UNITED  NATIONS,
GLOBAL  REPORT  ON  CRIME  AND  JUSTICE 312-14  (Grame Newman  ed., 1999) (listing
homicide  rates  for more  than  three  dozen  industrial  countries  as  reported  in  five
United  Nations surveys  between  1974  and  1993).
3.  Id.
4.  HOMICIDE  TRENDS,  supra note  1,  at  § 3.
5.  Keith  Bradsher,  Fear of Crime Trumps the Fear of Lost  Youth,  N.Y. TIMES,
Nov.  21,  1999, at  D3.THE NEW POLICING
the current year, although some major cities, including Boston, ex-
perienced  an ominous spike  in the first few months of 2000.6
Between  1993 and  1998, property crimes  declined  in the United
States  by 32%  and  violent  crimes  declined  by  27%.  The  decline
has been spectacular  with regard to such non-violent crimes as mo-
tor vehicle theft or ordinary thefts of less than fifty dollars.  Moreo-
ver,  this  decline  has  been  about  equally  sharp  for  males  and
females,  black  and white,  urban, suburban,  and rural.7
One  area  of great public concern  did  not appear  to follow  this
general course.  Although the use of illicit drugs had peaked in the
late  1970s,  and the decline  that followed  in the mid-1980s  was  re-
versed by an epidemic of smokable crack cocaine, there was a great
decline  in overall  use in  the  1980s  and, except  for marijuana  use,
prevalence  of use  in the  population  continued  at  a relatively  low
level into the 1990s. 8  However, there  is little, if any, indication that
the price of illicit drugs has  risen or that their purity has declined,
nor is there any reason to think that their availability has lessened.9
The  crack  cocaine  epidemic  has greatly abated;  but that seems  to
have  far more  to  do with  the  natural  course  of a  drug epidemic,
including  the growing  desire of young people  to avoid  the  conse-
quences they see  in their addicted elders, than with any success in
6.  E.g., Tom Farmer,  Violent Crimes Plunge in U.S.,  BOSTON  HERALD, Aug.  28,
2000,  at 1 (noting  that Boston had  already surpassed  its  1999 murder total, and  that
police  had  reported  a  13%  increase  in  shootings);  Brett Martel, Murder on Rise in
Major Cities, CHI.  SUN-TIMES,  June  23,  2000,  at  26 (reporting  that  murders  had  in-
creased over 1999 murder rates in Baltimore, Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orle-
ans, New York, and Philadelphia); Don Terry,  In a Turn of the  Tide, Bloodshed Rises
in Los Angeles, N.Y.  TIMES, July  11,  2000,  at A14  (reporting  a 7.5%  increase  in vio-
lent crime over  1999  in Los  Angeles,  including more  murders, rapes, and  robberies,
but noting that "with  only a few exceptions, violent crime  is down nationwide").  But
see, e.g.,  Eric Lipton, Giuliani Pulls His Charts Out for a Review of New  York,  N.Y.
TIMES, Sept.  15,  2000, at B9 ("In the first  six months of this year, crimes  in the seven
major categories  fell 7.8%" in  New York  City).
7.  BUREAU  OF JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  U.S. DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  NATIONAL  CRIME
VICTIMIZATION  SURVEY,  CRIMINAL  VICTIMIZATION  1998,  CHANGES  1997-98  WITH
TRENDS 1993-98,  at 9 tbl.7,  11 tbl.8, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv98.pdf  (re-
porting sharp  declines  in property  crimes  and  declines  in  violent crimes for specific
demographic  groups  between 1993  and  1998)  [hereinafter  VICTIMIZATION  SURVEY].
8.  BUREAU  OF  JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF JUSTICE,  SOURCEBOOK  OF
CRIMINAL  JUSTICE  STATISTICS  1997, at  245 tbl.3.83  (1998).
9.  OFFICE OF NAT'L  DRUG  CONTROL  POLICY,  DRUG  DATA  SUMMARY  4  (1999)
(explaining  the increase  in  purity  and  decrease  in  price  for four  types of drugs  be-
tween  1981  and  1998),  available  at  http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf./
95253.pdf.
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policing, despite mammoth increases since 1980 in expenditure and
in rates and duration  of imprisonment.10
Returning to the sudden reduction in violence, particularly in le-
thal  violence,  since  the  early  1990s,  a  number  of  consequences
should  be  noted.  Evidence  ranging  from  the  self-reports  of
mothers  and  children  in Boston to  the immense  increase  in opti-
mism and tourism in New York documents the change  in the qual-
ity  of life that  has  been  brought  about by  reduced  violence,  and
perhaps  also by  reduced property  crime  and  disorder.  Leaders in
cities  as  far  away  as  Johannesburg,  Moscow,  and  Buenos  Aires
want to  learn whatever  there is to learn  about the relationship  of
new forms  of policing to  a wonderfully improved  quality of life in
many American  neighborhoods  and  cities.
If policing  really is  making the  difference,  we  should  acknowl-
edge that fact in terms of a variety of decisions about the expendi-
ture of resources.  Resources should be moving toward police from
the immense  human  and  dollar  costs  of the present  rush towards
ever  longer sentences  that  have  made  us  one  of the  world's  two
leaders  in  percentage  of population  behind  bars.'  At the  same
time, the general public may be willing to bear new personal costs
associated  with intrusive  policing measures,  if the  benefits  are  as
great  as  they  seem.  In  Chicago,  for  example,  tenants  of housing
projects  have  voted  to  authorize  apartment  searches  without  the
prerequisites  of the Fourth Amendment, a move rejected by a fed-
eral court.
12
B.  Are  the Increase in Safety  and the  Reduction in Fear
Results  of the New  Forms of Policing  in the United  States?
The  accelerating reduction  in violent and other crime beginning
in the early  1990s plainly coincided  with a series of major changes
in policing.  The three cities we are examining, New York, Chicago,
10.  E.g.,  Richard  Curtis,  Symposium,  The Improbable Transformation of Inner-
City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM.  L. &
CRIMINOLOGY  1233,  1260 (1998)  (stating that many African American youth through-
out New York  City have avoided heroin and crack  in the 1990s because of such factors
as the AIDS epidemic  and  the increased  death toll  from drug dealer  turf wars).
11.  HUMAN  RIGHTS  WATCH,  HUMAN  RIGHTS  WATCH  WORLD  REPORT  1999,  at
387  (1998);  see  also  BUREAU  OF  JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK  OF CRIMINAL  JUSTICE  STATISTICS  1996, at  528  tbl.6.30  (1997)  (noting
that the number of prisoners  in custody of federal  and state authorities  was 1,037,686
in  1995).
12.  Pratt  v.  Chicago  Hous.  Auth.,  848  F.  Supp.  792  (N.D.  Ill.  1994);  Tracey  L.
Meares  & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, BOSTON  REV.,  Apr./May  1999, at
4  (providing  an overview  of the incident).
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and Boston, all  began  new programs  shortly before  1995.  As we
shall  see, there  are  common-sense  and theoretical  reasons  to  be-
lieve that the forms of policing have made  a difference; but before
awarding  the credit to policing, we  should recognize  the claims of
other contenders  in explaining  reduced  crime.
1.  Some Other Explanations for Declining Rates of Crime
There  are reasons  to  look for  alternative  explanations.  Violent
and other crime is decreasing in many cities throughout the United
States, including  in cities  where policing strategies are very differ-
ent from those of New York,  Chicago,  or Boston.  New York  and
Boston have enjoyed remarkable  rates of decline, but so have sev-
eral  other  cities,  which  are  implementing  quite  different  ap-
proaches a3  Moreover,  other  factors  unrelated  to  policing,  but
highly correlated  with the conditions  we associate  with crime,  are
changing  at  the  same  time.  Teenage  pregnancy  has  gone  down
steadily  during  the last  six  or  seven years."  The  decline  in birth
rates  between  1991  and 1996  among black teens between the ages
of fifteen and nineteen is particularly striking.1 5  There seems to be
no obvious relationship between policing and teenage pregnancies,
although there  has  always  been  a close relationship  among crime,
violence,  teen  pregnancy,  drug  use,  and  other  forms  of  social
breakdown.1 6  That  suggests  that an additional  factor-other than
policing-may  be at work.
Several candidates  seem obvious.  First, the drop in crime could
be  tied  to  the  sustained  economic  boom.  Not  only  has  poverty
been  declining since  1993  for juveniles under  the age of eighteen,
but the proportion  of black juveniles  (whose  involvement  in dan-
gerous violence  as  victim  or perpetrator has been  much  the high-
est)  living  in  poverty  has also  been  declining  sharply  during  that
13.  Compare  BUREAU  OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP'T OF JUSTICE,  CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION  AND  PERCEPTIONS  OF  COMMUNITY  SAFETY  IN  12  CITIES,  1998,  at 9
(1999)  (reporting that New  York's murder  rate  fell  65.8%  between  1990  and  1997)
[hereinafter  COMMUNITY  SAFETY],  with id. (reporting that  San  Diego's murder rate
fell 53.3%  during the same period), and id. (reporting that Los Angeles's  murder rate
fell  42.2%  during the  same period).
14.  Marc  Lacey,  Teen-Age  Birth Rate in  U.S.  Falls Again, N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  27,
1999, at  A16.
15.  Judith Havemann, Birthrate  Drops  for Teens of All Races, WASH.  POST, May 1,
1998, at Al  (reporting  a  20.6%  drop for black teens  during that  period).
16.  E.g., JAN  M. CHAIKEN &  MARCIA  R. CHAIKEN,  VARIETIES  OF CRIMINAL  BE-
HAVIOR:  SUMMARY  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  25  (1982)  (noting that "[d]rug  use  is
one  of the major factors associated  with virtually every  type of crime [ ] studied, and
specific  forms  of drug use correlate  strongly  with crime types and rates").
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period.17  Unemployment  is at near-record lows; and by 1996, 86%
of black young adults  were completing  high school.18
There are a number of other available explanations, besides new
forms  of policing,  which  supporters  would claim  have  led  to  the
reduction of crime and the fear of crime.  During the last few years,
we  have  seen  the  end of the  crack  epidemic  in most  cities,19  an
epidemic which spawned  drug-selling gangs and the varieties of vi-
olent crime that we associate with the Prohibition era of the 1920s.
Drug markets  have  stabilized.  Dealers  in stabilized industries  do
not kill each other;  thus, dealers in illicit drugs may be particularly
violent  only at the early stages  of a rapidly expanding  market.2°
Just  as  the  use  of  crack  declined  when  successive  generations
witnessed  the degrading  experiences  of older brothers  and sisters,
the same learning-but this time about guns-may have happened
as a result of the violence of the late 1980s.21  A very high percent-
age of young  people  in  disadvantaged  neighborhoods  had friends
who  had been  killed.22
Efforts  of people other  than the  police to  deal  with youth vio-
lence  also played a role.  Prevention efforts by committed members
of  the  community,  including  organizations  such  as  churches  and
schools, increased immensely in response to the burst of youth vio-
lence,  and helped  make  a difference.23
Another  quite  provocative  explanation,  recently  advanced  in  a
leading  economics  journal,  is  the rise  of legalized  abortion  some
17.  BUREAU  OF THE  CENSUS,  U.S. DEP'T OF  COMMERCE,  U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU
HISTORICAL  POVERTY  TABLES-PEOPLE  tbl.3,  available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.htm  (current through Nov. 30,  2000).
18.  NAT'L  CTR.  FOR  EDUC.  STATISTICS,  DIGEST  OF  EDUCATION  STATISTICS  17
tbl.8 (1998).
19.  E.g., Alexandra Marks,  Teens Drive Decline of "Crack" Craze, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR,  Jan. 6,  1999,  at 1;  Lance  Williams, Crime Drop Mirrors Falling Popularity
of Crack Cocaine,  ST.  Louis  POST-DISPATCH,  Nov. 29,  1998,  at A14.
20.  Fox  Butterfield,  Drop in  Homicide Rate  Linked to  Crack's Decline, N.Y.
TIMES,  Oct. 27,  1997, at A12 (reporting on a Justice Department study finding that the
"waning of the crack cocaine epidemic"  was the "most important reason" for the drop
in  homicide  rates through  the 1990s).
21.  E.g.,  Fox  Butterfield,  Scared Straight; The  Wisdom  of Children Who  Have
Known Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, June  8,  1997, at D1  (discussing how inner-city  youth
are "recoil[ing]  from the gun culture"  because many have witnessed  shootings or seen
relatives or friends incarcerated).
22.  E.g.,  id.
23.  See generally John Buntin, A Community Responds:  Boston Confronts an Up-
surge of Youth Violence (1999)  (unpublished manuscript written for John F. Kennedy
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twenty years prior to the beginning  of the decline in crime  rates. 24
Indeed, the article attributes  roughly half of the decrease in crime
to the government's  newfound  protection of the right to choose.
Finally, there  are those who would argue passionately,  and per-
suasively, that the reduction  in violent crime  was traceable  far less
to policing and any increase in the numbers of arrests than to legis-
lation and the  longer prison  sentences  it  imposed,  along with the
consequent  prolonged incapacitation  of violent offenders.  A rela-
tively  small  proportion  of  the  people  born  in  any  given  year  is
likely  to  commit  a  high percentage  of the crimes  and  a very  high
percentage  of the violent  crimes.  When  we  lock up  a higher and
higher  proportion  of the population  for longer  periods of time,  a
very high proportion of this particularly dangerous group is impris-
oned because they offend and risk arrest so often.  This reduces the
level  of violence  on our  streets,  albeit  at great cost.  And, some-
what less plausibly, believers in increased deterrence resulting from'
the perceived threat of a very long sentence for those who are suc-
cessfully caught and prosecuted have  argued that the reductions  in
crime  are directly traceable  to  that deterrent.
2.  The Case for New Forms of Policing as a Major Cause of
Reduced Crime
With so many  other explanations, why  is there reason to believe
that new  forms of policing are playing  a  significant role  in the re-
duction of violence  and fear?  For one thing, some of the sharpest
reductions  in  crime  have  taken  place  in  Boston  and  New  York
where  the  new  forms  of policing  have  been  the  most thoroughly
explored  and  most  enthusiastically  implemented.  For  another,
some of the connections between the new forms of policing and the
reduction in violence  are so plausible that it is hard to imagine that
they  have  not  had  a  major  effect.  Finally,  some  fairly  rigorous
evaluations  of  recent  policing  tactics  support  the  hypothesis  of
effectiveness.
We know, for example, that the increase in youth homicide  was
almost entirely attributable to homicides with guns; there has been
24.  John  J. Donohue  III & Steven  D. Levitt, Legalized Abortion and Crime, 115
Q.J.  ECON.  (forthcoming  2000),  at  http://www.mitpress.mit.edu/journals/QJEC/
forthcoming.html.
25.  See, e.g.,  Daniel Kessler & Steven  D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to
Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation,  42 J.L. &  ECON.  343,  346  (1999)
(employing a novel approach to separating  incapacitation effects  from deterrence ef-
fects, and finding that the latter had  a "nontrivial"  effect on a series of 1982 sentence
enhancements  in  California).
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no  significant  increase  in  homicide  with  other  weapons.26  And
both  trends  have  worked  in reverse.  As  Professor  Alfred  Blum-
stein of Carnegie  Mellon University and Professor Richard Rosen-
feld of the University  of Missouri-St.  Louis have  pointed out, the
reduction in national homicides in the mid-1990s was very close to
the  reduction  in the  number  of gun  homicides,  suggesting  again
that control of guns has been an important  tactic. 7  We also know
that many  homicides  occur  because  of quarrels  and  other events
taking place  on  the streets.  Policing  strategies  like those  of New
York that greatly increase  the risk  of arrest  for carrying  a  gun  on
the street,  particularly  for  gangs or  other  groups  that  have  more
frequently  engaged  in violence,  should  therefore  lead  to  reduced
homicides  with  guns.  In  fact,  those  are the  homicides  that  have
been declining rapidly.
Similarly, we have believed for centuries that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment  are  critical  to  the effectiveness  of deterrence.
In Boston, the police are using their powers in new ways to ensure
that  the  deterrent  threat  to  particularly  dangerous  individuals  is
very certain  and prompt, targeted  specifically  to  a particular  type
of conduct  such  as  violence,  and  directly  communicated  to  those
most likely to use violence.  To determine who is most likely to use
violence, Boston police have analyzed data from reports or investi-
gations and have used computers to compile information available
by observation of associations  on the street.  Strategies, like those
adopted  in  Boston, to  assure  that speed  and  certainty  of punish-
ment are known to those  likely to engage  in violence seem almost
certain to reduce  violence.
In both New York and Boston, creating social control and, relat-
edly, reducing fear, have been -accomplished by using the powers of
the police to take  back the street from gangs.  The Department  of
Justice's Office  of Juvenile  Justice and Delinquency Prevention es-
timates that, in 1996, almost 3000 homicides in large cities and sub-
urban counties  were  attributed to  gang members.28  Reducing  the
apparent street power  of gangs competing for status, turf, or drug
profits seems  likely  to reduce  gang homicides.
26.  Alfred  Blumstein  &  Richard  Rosenfeld,  Explaining Recent  Trends in  U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM.  L. & CRIMINOLOGY  1175, 1196 (1998);  see also id. at 1194
fig.6b,  1195  fig.6c.
27.  Id. at  1196.
28.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE  JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY  PREVENTION,  1996  NATIONAL
YOUTH  GANG  SURVEY  32  (1999).THE NEW POLICING
3.  A  Closer Look at What We  Know About Police Tactics and
Reduced Crime
There is  another way to  look at developments  in policing-one
that does not rely so exclusively on the theories of a few academics
and police  commissioners.  The  broad  models of policing in  cities
like Chicago, New York, and Boston, can be usefully disaggregated
by first identifying the critical powers of the police and then analyz-
ing the innovative  ways these powers  are being used.  It is useful to
begin with a reminder  of the powers, legitimate  and borderline  le-
gitimate, granted to the  police  in the United States.  It is through
the  use  of  those powers  in  a particular  set  of  tactics  that  street
crime may be reduced, either by creating deterrence,  gathering in-
telligence, or establishing  a feeling of police or neighborhood  con-
trol of the streets.  What we know about the use of these powers to
reduce  crime  should  be  reviewed,  before  turning  to  the  broader
and  more  complex  strategies  that  have  characterized  policing  in
Chicago, New York, and Boston.  The present powers of the police
are relatively well known:
1. To  arrest,  search,  or  engage  in  electronic  surveillance  if
there is probable cause to conclude that the person has com-
mitted  a crime.29
2. To seek or  give a suspect concessions  in exchange  for infor-
mation or evidence  useful against  others.3°
3. To "stop" if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the
person  is about to commit a crime  or has just committed  a
crime,  and  to frisk if there is reason  to fear the person may
be armed.3'
4.  To "stop"  cars on the ground that they are being operated in
any way, however  minor, in violation of local ordinances  or
state  laws.32
5. To seek consent  to search  the stopped  car or, alternatively,
to search without consent by either arresting the driver for a
traffic  violation  or developing  a  reasonable  suspicion  that
the driver might be armed.33
6. To  take  advantage  of even  obvious confusion  by a suspect
about whether he has a right to say  "no" to a search  of his
29.  Dalia v.  United  States, 441  U.S. 238,  256  (1979).
30.  United  States v.  Baldwin,  60 F.3d  363,  365 (7th  Cir.  1995).
31.  Terry v. Ohio, 392  U.S.  1, 24  (1968).
32.  Maryland  v.  Wilson,  519 U.S. 408,  412 (1997).
33.  Adams  v.  Williams,  407  U.S.  143,  147 (1972).
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home, car, or person, or to refuse to answer questions when
not formally under  compulsion to remain.34
7.  To imply, deceitfully,  that they intend to exercise  powers of
arrest or restraint that they  in fact do not have, in  order to
gain  leverage  to  force  a  recalcitrant  witness  or  suspect to
cooperate.
8. To suggest a possible use of force even though its use would
be illegal.
3 6
9. To engage in any of these activities in a way that is  designed
to  interfere  with  the  subject's  personal  or  business
relations.37
10.  To analyze  material  obtained in reports or investigations  of
individual  crimes  and  to  gather  useful  intelligence  from
these  reports.38
Police  in the United States have long had a tool kit that includes
at least the powers described above.  Exceeding these considerable
powers  by imposing summary punishment, using unnecessary force
to  arrest,  or  disregarding  someone's  privacy  and  property  rights
without probable cause is generally  a violation of local and federal
law.  To ignore the limitations on the use of these powers-even by
actions that would  not be  criminal  if carried  out by ordinary  citi-
zens  but which  misuse  the  apparent  powers  and  authority  of the
police-is an  occasion for department discipline.
What do we know about the success of various tactics using these
powers, reserving for later a discussion of the broad strategies that
are  a  collection  of  tactics  in  Chicago,  New  York,  and  Boston?
There  is  much  guesswork  in  this.  Fairly  rigorous  recent  experi-
ments clarify a good deal about what forms of policing actually re-
duce  crime.  A  review  of  evaluations  done  by  a  team  at  the
University of Maryland  for Congress  and  the Department  of Jus-
tice  tells us a  good  deal about what  "works. '39
34.  Schneckloth  v.  Bustamonte,  412  U.S. 218, 224  (1973).
35.  Green  v.  Scully,  850  F.2d 894,  903  (2d  Cir. 1988).
36.  E.g.,  Payne  v.  Arkansas, 356  U.S.  560 (1958)  (excluding  a confession  coerced
with the threat of mob  violence). Contra Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894  (2d  Cir. 1988)
(holding a confession  voluntary even though the police  officer threatened the suspect
with  the death penalty,  which  was  not used  in New  York State at the  time).
37.  See, e.g.,  Dalia  v. United  States, 441  U.S. 238,  248 n.8  (1979)  (upholding  elec-
tronic surveillance of all oral communications  taking place  within a suspect's place  of
business).
38.  E.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23  (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming a
firearms  conviction  based on  evidence obtained  in a drug investigation).
39.  Lawrence  W. Sherman, Policing  for Crime Prevention,  in LAWRENCE  W. SHER-
MAN  ET AL.,  PREVENTING  CRIME:  WHAT  WORKS,  WHAT DOESN'T,  WHAT'S  PROMIS-
ING:  A  REPORT  TO THE  UNITED  STATES  CONGRESS  (1997).
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In Policing  for Crime Prevention, Professor  Lawrence  W.  Sher-
man of the University of Maryland  analyzes  the evaluations  of po-
licing  strategy.  He  concludes  first  that,  although  the  evidence  is
inconsistent,  the more convincing studies  show that an increase  in
the  number  of police causes  reductions  in crime  in the  following
year,  especially  in larger  cities  with  higher  crime  rates.4 0  This  is
supported  by the  evidence  of epidemics  of crime when  the police
are on strike41 and by the obvious  logic that the presence  of more
police increases the risk that an individual committing  a crime  will
be apprehended, resulting in both a deterrent and an incapacitative
effect.
On  the other  hand,  Sherman  finds  that rapid  response  to  calls
from victims does not have  a significant effect on crime reduction,
when measured  against the resources it requires.  Too many crimes
are  discovered  after  the fact  and even  a  crime that  is discovered
promptly is not affected by rapid response if the time between the
commission  of the crime and the initial contact with the police ex-
ceeds  nine minutes.  Indeed,  the  average  reporting  time  for  such
crimes was forty-one  minutes later.4 2  Nor did random patrol deter
crime  by creating a sense of police omnipresence.  Among  a group
of studies, none of which Sherman deemed especially rigorous, the
stronger  studies  suggest that there is  no such effect.43
What does make a difference, careful evaluations show, is focus-
ing patrol resources on places  and times that have the most crime.
The idea  is supported  by epidemiological  research that has shown
that  crime  tends  to  be  very localized 4  and  by  careful  studies  in
Minneapolis  suggesting  that doubling the police presence led  to a
50%  decrease  in crime in the hot spots, even when the police were
not present.45  It also often led to increased neighborhood calls for
service  in  the  "hot  spot"  areas.46  As  to  curfews,  not  enough  is
40.  Id. at  8-1.
41.  E.g.,  SANFORD  H. KADISH  &  STEPHEN J.  SCHULHOFER,  CRIMINAL  LAW  AND
ITS  PROCESSES  117  (6th ed.  1995)  (noting  the looting that followed  a police strike in
Liverpool in  1919).
42.  Sherman, supra note  39,  at 8-2.
43.  E.g.,  Robert Trojanowicz,  Evaluating a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program:
The Flint, Michigan Project, in COMMUNITY  CRIME  PREVENTION:  DOES  IT WORK?
(Dennis Rosenbaum  ed.  1986), cited by Sherman, supra note  39, at  8-3.
44.  Sherman,  supra note  39,  at  8-3  - 8-4  (citing  epidemiological  studies  showing
that crime is  localized).
45.  Id. at 8-15  (citing  Lawrence  W. Sherman  & David A. Weisburd,  General De-
terrence Effects  of Police Patrol in  Crime "Hot Spots": A  Randomized,  Controlled
Trial, 12 JUST.  Q.  625  (1995)).
46.  Sherman,  supra note  39  (indicating  that  crime-related  calls  for  service  in-
creased  in hot spots as  a result of increased  police presence).
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known yet  to determine  whether  they are  an effective  way of re-
ducing crime,  particularly  among juveniles.
In a  related  way, concentrating  limited  police  resources  on  an
identified band of particularly dangerous individuals or crimes also
reduces  crime.  We  know  that a  small fraction of a total birth  co-
hort  commits  a  very  high  percentage  of  crimes  perpetrated  by
members of that cohort.  Targeting the more dangerous people had
the  hoped-for  effect  of reducing  crime  in  Washington  and  Phoe-
nix.47  The  case  is  less  clear  with  regard  to  targeting  dangerous
crimes, with  two notable  exceptions:  seizing guns  and drunk driv-
ing.48  Efforts  to  detect  and  seize  guns  have  proven  to  be  im-
mensely  effective  in  Kansas  City.  When  gun seizures  in a target
area  rose by 60%,  gun  crime dropped  by almost 50%.
49
There  are  at least  some  positive  short-term  effects  of focusing
policing on activities  that create  a sense of disorder in a neighbor-
hood-tending to  support the "Broken  Windows '5 0  theory that is
described  later.51  But, as  in the case of making additional  arrests
for  misdemeanors  and  for  other  crimes  for  which  an  individual
might not previously have been arrested (even if caught in the act),
the deterrent  and incapacitative  effects  may be significantly  offset
by  countervailing  long-term  effects.  Studies  show  that recidivism
of juveniles  increases  following  arrest.52  The same is  true of some
other  categories  of offenders,  such  as unemployed  men  guilty  of
domestic violence. 3  There is a reminder in all these statistics that
the long-term effects of invoking the criminal justice system for rel-
atively minor behavior can be to increase rather than reduce crime
through  its  effect  on  the  life  prospects  or  psychology  of the  ar-
rested  individual.
47.  Id. at  8-20 - 8-21 (citing  Susan Martin & Lawrence W.  Sherman, Selective Ap-
prehension:  A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders, 24 CRIMINOLOGY  55  (1986); Allan
F. Abrahamse  et  al.,  An  Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix Repeat Offender
Program,  8  JusT. Q.  141  (1991)).
48.  Sherman, supra note  39, at  8-24  (citing  James  W. Shaw,  Community Policing
Against Crime: Violence and Firearms  (1994)  (unpublished  Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Maryland  (College  Park));  Ross Homel, Random Breath Testing and Random
Stopping  Programs in  Australia, in  DRINKING  AND  DRIVING:  ADVANCES  IN  RE-
SEARCH  AND  PREVENTION  (R.J.  Wilson & R. E. Mann eds.,  1990)).
49.  Sherman, supra note 39, at 8-31  (citing LAWRENCE  W. SHERMAN  ET AL.,  NAT'L
INST.  OF JUSTICE,  THE  KANSAS  CITY  GUN  EXPERIMENT  (1995)).
50.  James  Q.  Wilson & George  L. Kelling,  The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows,  ATLANTIC MONTHLY,  Mar. 1982,  at 29-38.
51.  Infra Part III.A.2.
52.  E.g.,  Malcolm  Klein, Labeling Theory and Delinquency Policy: An  Empirical
Test, 13  CRIM. J. & BEHAV.  47  (1986),  cited by Sherman, supra note 39,  at 8-16,  8-18.
53.  Sherman, supra note 39,  at 8-19  (citing  several  studies).THE NEW POLICING
As to the  specific crime-reduction  benefits  attributed  to consci-
entious  efforts  to  improve  police  relations  with  neighborhoods,
Sherman  explains:  "Neighborhood  watch"  groups  seem to  be  al-
most wholly ineffective,  perhaps because cooperation is least likely
to  be  found  in high  crime  areas  where distrust  is widespread,  al-
though community meetings can help mobilize citizen participation
in reducing  crime.  Police visits to citizens'  homes  are  also helpful,
at least among non-minority  groups, because  they facilitate  intelli-
gence  gathering and  otherwise elicit  support for police.  Providing
information  to the neighborhood  rather than  eliciting information
from  the  neighborhood  showed  no  sign  of  affecting  or  reducing
crime  when  it  was  tried  in  Newark  and  Houston.5 4  Finally,  re-
search consistently  demonstrates  that individuals  who believe  that
the police treated them fairly and respectfully  in their previous en-
counters  are more  likely  to obey the law in the future.55
Such specific, fact-based arguments  are more persuasive than ex-
clusive reliance on the broader contentions that significant changes
in violence must be attributable to changed policing simply because
there were  no parallel changes  in social  conditions  that could  ex-
plain  the  drop  in  violence.  In  fact,  as we  have  seen, there  have
been  dramatic  changes  in  social  and  economic  factors,  from  the
availability  of jobs  to  an  end to  the  growth  of the  crack  market,
which  could explain  a rapid  reduction  in violent  crime.
Moreover,  even  small changes  in social conditions  can  result in
dramatic  differences  in  crime  or  other  social  phenomena  when
there is a contagion effect.56  A small increase in the availability  of
guns, for  example, could  readily result  in a geometric  increase  in
the number of young people feeling they need guns, and these in-
creases  could  in turn  lead to still further geometric  increases.  We
simply  cannot  assume  that  big  changes  in  criminal  behavior  can
only be brought about  by dramatic changes  of some  other sort.
C.  Changes  in Public and Political  Attitudes Toward  Policing
However  strong  one  may  find the  evidence  that  new  forms  of
policing are far more successful  in reducing crime  of almost every
sort, other than the sale of drugs, the case  has been strong enough
and made persuasively  enough to create a  very substantial  change
in expert, official,  and public expectations  about the crime-reduc-
54.  Id. at  8-25  - 8-26.
55.  Id. at  8-26, 8-29  (citing an  unpublished  study).
56.  MALCOLM  GLADWELL, THE TIPPING  POINT: How LITTLE THINGS  CAN  MAKE
A  BIG  DIFFERENCE  (2000).
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tion  and other functions  of policing.  One  way of illustrating  that
change  is to examine  the change  in notions about the types of ac-
tions for which the police  should  be held accountable.
South Africa  is  one  of many countries  that measures  the effec-
tiveness of its police by their capacity to solve reported crimes and
the speed  with which  police respond to calls.57  South African po-
lice claim, unreliably, to have reduced response time to an average
of a very few minutes.58  They are now concentrating  on improving
what  happens  next:  detective  work  relying  extensively  on  ques-
tioning of witnesses  and suspects and on forensics.59  In this frame-
work,  it makes  sense  that, in  late  1999,  the  South  African  police
would  only  reluctantly  take  a  report  from  my  friend,  a  driver
whose rear  window had  been  smashed  with a brick  during an at-
tempted  carjacking.  Enough  time  had passed  to  ensure  that the
perpetrators  had  fled, and  my  friend  could  not herself  provide  a
useful  description  of  the  suspects.  There  was  simply  no  way  to
solve such a crime, and, because the police in South Africa are con-
sidered accountable for solving  all crimes that have been reported,
the police were  not interested  in recording information  about the
crime.
Law enforcement  officials in the United States have learned that
most victims do not call police promptly enough to enable them to
catch the perpetrator  at the scene of the crime  and that  detective
work cannot be relied  on to solve the great mass of street crimes.6°
With that awareness, our policing strategies in the last decade have
turned  heavily  towards  prevention  of  crimes,  using  the  help  of
those in a neighborhood  and focusing  on general problems  rather
than  individual events.
Faced with a situation like the attempted carjacking in South Af-
rica, a police department  with a prevention-focused  strategy would
57.  See, e.g.,  COMM'R  OF THE S.  AFR. POLICE, ANNUAL  REPORT OF THE  COMMIS-
SIONER  OF  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  POLICE 95  (1993)  (employing percentage  of crimes
solved  as the statistical  gauge of police  success).
58.  See,  e.g.,  Averil  Millard,  South Africa-Security Industry/CCTV, NATIONAL
TRADE  DATA  BANK  MARKET  REPS.,  Aug.  1,  1999, available in LEXIS,  Middle  East
and Africa Stories ("Many  South Africans have said that they feel the  police are  too
slow in  their response  to calls,  or they do not  respond  at all.").
59.  See, e.g., Marina Bidoli, Scorpions' Hi-Tech Sting, FIN. MAIL (S.  Afr.), June 23,
2000,  at  43 (reporting  on  new technology to help  police  officers  streamline  their ef-
forts to track down  suspects).
60.  E.g.,  WILLIAM  SPELMAN  & DALE K.  BROWN,  CALLING  THE POLICE:  CITIZEN
REPORTING  OF  SERIOUS  CRIME,  at  xxiv  (1984)  (reporting that,  of  those  crimes in
which fast response  could make  a difference,  "only  54 percent  ...  were  likely  to be
made in time enough, that is within five minutes, to afford police a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make  on-scene arrests").
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want to record and analyze the information; together with informa-
tion on recent and similar events at nearby locations, it would sug-
gest  a  set  of  ways  that  the  carjacking  activity  could  be  stopped.
Some of these would be imaginative devices for making arrests and
getting  convictions,  such  as  sending  undercover  operatives  to the
location  or using  leverage  on people  arrested  for  other crimes  in
that area to gather information.  A problem-solving  police depart-
ment would also consider changing traffic patterns, eliminating the
stop signs that make it possible to smash the window of a stopped
car and immediately reach inside.  It might also try to build a com-
munity's support for lawfulness,  trust in the police, internal coher-
ence,  and  "social  capital"'61  to  the  point  that  bystanders  in  the
neighborhood  would help deal with the problem.
Problem-solving  policing has received  a great  deal  of credit for
reduced crime.  As this has happened, elected officials and the pub-
lic  have  come  to  hold  the  police  responsible  for reducing  crime,
and particularly violence, by dealing with the problems  that create
the  opportunity  or  temptation  to  safely  commit  crimes  that  are
dangerous  and  create  fear.  In  terms  of  accountability,  we  have
come to assume that the work of the police can be measured by the
crime rate, not the  arrest or conviction  rate.  Both New York  and
Boston have met that standard  of accountability  remarkably.
If the police are indeed coming to be held accountable for reduc-
ing crime, there is disagreement with regard to another question: to
whom are they  accountable?  The  South African  Constitution  re-
quires  a  national  police  force,  accountable  to  the  nation  as  a
whole.62  In the United States, city police departments are held  ac-
countable  for the  crime  figures  of cities  as  large  as  Boston,  Chi-
cago, and New York.  But we also believe that they are accountable
to local  communities and for developing ways that local communi-
ties can impose social control  themselves, assist the police, and fo-
cus the efforts of police and neighborhoods  on issues that concern
the neighborhood  most.  New York attempts to focus responsibility
at the  level  of each  of its  seventy-five  precincts.  Chicago  tries to
devolve  responsibility  down to  the level  of a beat officer  within  a
precinct.  In short, we are coming to accept the fact that police are
accountable  to  neighborhoods  as well as to cities,  and  responsible
61.  E.g.,  ROBERT  D. PUTNAM,  BOWLING  ALONE:  THE  COLLAPSE  AND  REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN  COMMUNITY  (2000)  (describing  social capital  as the collective  value  of
all  social networks  and the norms of reciprocity that arise  from those networks).
62.  S. AFR.  CONST.  ch. 14,  § 214.
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for providing what the neighborhood  wants  as well  as for assuring
reduced  danger and  fear in  the city at large.
II.  THE NEW  POLICING  STRATEGIES
All  this  is the setting for a more  detailed exploration of what  is
changing in policing, with a particular focus on three major cities at
the forefront  of change:  Chicago,  New York,  and  Boston.  Each
has developed  its own variation  of the  new strategies of policing.
Each has  claimed that its  variation  is  best  and deserves  the most
credit either in terms of reduced crime, increased public acceptabil-
ity of the police, or reduced fear.  I will explore each  of these strat-
egies  and  compare  their  effectiveness  with  contemporary
developments  in the United Kingdom.
A.  Chicago  and New  York
Chicago and New York have  taken dramatically  different direc-
tions in policing.  It is revealing that both would claim to be operat-
ing in the mode of "community  policing,"  a  claim that is required
for a city  is to get  funds from  the federal government  to increase
the number of its police.63  Both cities' models of policing grow out
of the same historical rejection of three approaches to policing that
had  taken  on  primary  importance:  random  car  patrol,  rapid  re-
sponse to calls for assistance, and skilled investigation of individual
crimes. 64  Both  reject  what  had become  the  accepted  measure  of
success:  arrest  rates.
Not  everything  about  the  older  model  of policing  is,  in  fact,
wrong.  Rapid  response  is  necessary  when  the  danger  of violent
crime  is  continuing.  Reactive  policing and skilled  detective  work
are, in fact, necessary  if the same perpetrator  is likely to attack the
same or related victims again.  One of the top priorities of policing
is, in the language  of Scotland  Yard,  "preventing  repeat victimisa-
tion.''65  Some  significant  measure  of success  in solving  dramatic
crimes is important to maintaining social mores, public morale, and
confidence  in the police  and government.  Still, conceding all this,
the limits of reactive policing,  and particularly  the failures of ran-
63.  42 U.S.C. § 3796dd  (1994).
64.  George  L.  Kelling  &  Mark  H.  Moore,  The  Evolving  Strategy of Policing,
PERSPS.  ON  POLICING, Nov.  1988, at 1, 7-9  (identifying these  approaches as pillars of
the "reform  era,"  and  explaining the reasons why they fell  into disfavor in the  1960s
and  1970s).
65.  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMISSIONER  OF  POLICE  OF  THE  METROPOLIS  6  (1998-
1999).
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dom patrol, rapid  response,  and  detective work  to meet  expecta-
tions required  that new strategies  be adopted.
I  have  traveled  with  the  police  rapid  response  team  ("flying
squad") in Johannesburg  as it rushed from emergency call to emer-
gency call, usually in response to reports of burglaries.  There, as in
the United States, the perpetrator was always gone by the time the
few minutes it took the police to arrive  was added to the few min-
utes it took the householder to call after the departure  of the bur-
glar.  Just as the South African police could not use detective work
to solve the attempted  carjacking described supra in Part I.C., they
could not  use  it to  solve  these burglaries,  or, in  fact,  many  other
crimes.  Therefore,  a different approach  to policing  is needed.
In the United States, an understanding  of the ineffectiveness  of
traditional  modes  of  policing,  which  had  been  established  by
careful  experiments,66  came  to  be  reflected  in  experiments  in
neighborhood-based  crime  control.6 7  These  neighborhood-based
approaches  also  addressed  the  dangers  of friction  between  police
and  youth  in  crime-infested  areas,  dangers  that had  exploded  in
riots in the late 1960s.  The new movements were conceptualized in
1979 in a seminal article by Professor Herman Goldstein calling for
the  police to  go  beyond merely  fighting  crime  and  responding  to
emergency  calls for help and assume  the responsibility  for finding
solutions  to  help prevent  and  reduce  a  broad  range  of problems
faced  by the community.68  Communities  across the country began
experimenting  with  various  applications  of  problem-solving
policing.
In the 1980s,  three other scholarly developments  encouraged  the
problem-solving  aspect  of what  was  to  become  the  new  policing:
the development of clear evidence linking disorder to fear of crime,
the  concept  of  "situational  prevention,"  and  the  notion  of  "hot
spots."  The  first  will  be  discussed  infra in  connection  with New
York.  The  concept  of situational  prevention,  which  originated  in
England,  is  that  implementing  measures,  tailored  to  particular
66.  E.g.,  GEORGE  L.  KELLING  ET  AL.,  THE  KANSAS  CITY  PREVENTIVE  PATROL
EXPERIMENT:  A  SUMMARY  REPORT  1-3  (1974)  (recounting  an  empirical  study  that
demonstrated, contrary  to conventional  wisdom of the period, that changes  in  police
patrol  policy had  no effect  on crime).
67.  This  sense that  traditional  modes  of  policing  were  ineffective  also  coincided
with the rise of privately funded security. The causal  link between  the former and the
latter  is certainly  open to question,  however, as privately funded  security has  grown
inexorably for many years  now. David A. Sklansky,  The Private Police, 46  UCLA L.
REV.  1165,  1175  (1999).
68.  Herman  Goldstein,  Improving Policing: A  Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME  AND  DELINQUENCY  236  (1979).
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crimes  and  locations,  that make  the commission  of the  particular
crime  more  difficult,  risky,  or less  rewarding,  will  discourage  the
commission of that crime.69
The  theory  of hot  spots  developed  from  research  and observa-
tions indicating that a disproportionate  percentage  of crime  is usu-
ally  concentrated  in  small  geographical  areas,  even  specific
addresses  or locations.7°  Identifying  hot spots  was  found  to  have
two benefits.  First, identifying  hot spots may allow police to apply
the  concept  of  situational  prevention  to  increase  the  stakes  for
criminal or disorderly behavior in the hot spots, through increasing
police presence in a particular area or increasing community efforts
to watch an area.  Second, identifying hot spots allows policing ana-
lysts  to  use  computer  technology  that  can  combine  the  hot  spot
locations  with  detailed  maps  of the  surrounding  area  to  attempt
identification  of location features that may help explain the reason
for the high rate  of crime.71
Beginning  in 1988, under the leadership  and sponsorship of Pro-
fessor  Mark  Moore  and  then-Attorney  General  Edwin  Meese,  a
distinguished group of police chiefs, mayors, academics, and others
met for five years and further developed the "twin poles of modern
policing":  (1) encouragement  of the participation,  at every  stage
and in  almost every  way, of the  neighborhood  being  policed;  and
(2)  addressing  crime  as a problem to be  solved prospectively, not
as an event to  be explained historically  by retrospective  investiga-




The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy ("CAPS")  started op-
erating in  prototype  districts  in April  1993.  Chicago  emphasized
the first pole-neighborhood  involvement-more  completely  and
enthusiastically than  almost any other city.  The  immediate  schol-
arly background  for this neighborhood  focus has been the work of
69.  Ronald  V.  Clarke,  Situational Crime Prevention: Its  Theoretical Basis and
Practical  Scope, in 4  CRIME  AND  JUSTICE:  AN  ANNUAL  REVIEW  OF  RESEARCH  225
(Michael Tonry  & Norval  Morris eds.,  1983).
70.  Lawrence  W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory  Crime: Routine Activities
and the Criminology of Place,  27  CRIMINOLOGY  1 (1989).
71.  WESLEY  G. SKOGAN  ET AL.,  ON  THE  BEAT:  POLICE  AND  COMMUNITY  PROB-
LEM-SOLVING  16-18  (1999).
72.  George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, PERSPS. ON
POLICING,  June  1988,  at  1,  8  (describing  the  Executive  Session on  Policing and  its
members  and  noting  a  "quiet  revolution"  in  American  policing  rooted,  in part,  in
community involvement  and prospective  tactics).
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Professor Wesley G. Skogan.73  The more remote scholarly support
is the Chicago criminological  tradition of emphasizing the relation
of the demographic  and sociological  conditions  of a neighborhood
to its rate of crime. 4
Current studies by Robert J. Sampson and Felton Earls have ad-
ded greatly to  this tradition  .7   The studies  show convincingly  that
the disparity  in crime rates within  areas  of Chicago  can be largely
accounted for by measurable  neighborhood  differences,  including,
prominently, differences  in those forms  of social  capital  reflected
by constructive involvement  in the concerns of neighbors-particu-
larly  the  willingness  to  assist  in  the  upbringing  of children.  The
development  of social  capital can be  encouraged  by working  with
neighborhood  organizations or helping to develop them.  It can be
discouraged  by  allowing  fear  to  force  individuals  to  retreat  into
their own houses,  away from groups  and  public places.
The form  of policing in Chicago relies  extensively on the neigh-
borhood  to  define  the  focus  of police  activities  as  the  police  at-
tempt  to  support  social  control.  If  the  neighbors  are  most
concerned  about  gangs  gathering  on  the  street or  noise  at night,
then these  should  become  police priorities.  There  is,  of course, a
risk that  the concerns  expressed  by  the  neighbors  are  shaped  by
assumptions  about  what the  police  can  and  cannot  do, including
doubts  about  police  capacity  to  reduce  many  forms  of  violence.
Still, there is a powerful democratic  claim that neighborhood  con-
cerns  should  be respected  as well  as an  instrumentalist  argument
that respecting  them  empowers  the neighborhood,  building social
capital and,  with that, social control.
This has not been just philosophy.  One of CAPS' unique charac-
teristics was the extent to which there was actual, sustained police-
community involvement  in  identifying  problems of concern to the
73.  E.g.,  WESLEY  G.  SKOGAN  &  MICHAEL  G. MAXFIELD,  COPING  WITH  CRIME:
INDIVIDUAL  AND  NEIGHBORHOOD  REACTIONS  (1981);  WESLEY.  G.  SKOGAN,  DISOR-
DER  AND  DECLINE:  CRIME  AND  THE  SPIRAL  OF  DECAY  IN  AMERICAN  NEIGHBOR-
HOODS  (1990).
74.  E.g.,  CLIFFORD  R.  SHAW &  HENRY  D. McKAY,  JUVENILE  DELINQUENCY  IN
URBAN  AREAS  108 (1942);  Robert  E. Park, Human Ecology, 42 AM.  J.  Soc. REV.  1
(1937); Ernest Burgess,  The Growth of the City: An Introduction  to a Research Project,
in THE  CITY  47 (Robert  E. Park  et  al. eds.,  1925).
75.  R. J. Sampson et  al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE,  Aug.  15,  1997,  at  918-24;  R. J. Sampson  et  al., Beyond
Social  Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy  For Children, 64  AM.  Soc.
REV.  633 (1999).
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community.76  Community involvement took two forms.  The most
fundamental  form  of  neighborhood  involvement  was  the  formal
practice  of regular meetings between  residents  and police officers
in  every  police  "beat. ''77  The  practice  of  regular  neighborhood
meetings was taken far more seriously  in Chicago than in most cit-
ies  with community  policing,  where  public meetings  were  limited
mostly to initial, kick-off meetings and occasional, poorly-attended
successors.
78
Beat meetings,  designed to identify problems  of concern  to the
particular community and formulate  solutions, generally were held
once  a  month  in  church  basements  and  park  buildings.79  The
CAPS  program encouraged  participation  of neighborhood  organi-
zations such  as block  clubs,  community  organizations,  client-serv-
ing  organizations,  churches,  and  merchants'  associations  in  the
monthly  beat  meetings,  as  well  as  participation  by  individual re-
sidents.  Research  on  the  CAPS  program  indicates that  different
communities  do, in  fact,  have  different  priorities  and  concerns.80
Communities  also  differed  significantly  in their  willingness  to  be-
come  engaged  with the CAPS  efforts.81
Another way  CAPS  attempted to use the community to identify
problems,  define  priorities,  identify  resources  and  solutions,  and
evaluate the effectiveness  of local CAPS efforts was through estab-
lishment of district advisory  committees.82  In  addition to meeting
with district commanders and staff on a monthly basis, committees
were intended  to establish subcommittees to help with the identifi-
cation  and  evaluation  roles  of the  committees,  concentrating  on
76.  In  the  CAPS  model,  a  "problem"  is  understood  as  a  recurring  situation  or
series of related  incidents  (unlikely to be resolved on their own)  that affect  a signifi-
cant portion  of the  community and  can possibly  be  affected  by the resources  of the
community and the  police.  SKOGAN  ET AL.,  supra note  71,  at  35.
77.  For CAPS purposes, the city's twenty-five police districts were divided into 279
beats, with  nine to fifteen beats per district.  In 1990, the  average beat included 3600
households,  or  about 9500 residents.  Id. at 58.
78.  WESLEY  G.  SKOGAN  &  ELIZABETH  M.  HARTNETr,  COMMUNITY  POLICING,
CHICAGO  STYLE  113  (1997).
79.  Id. at  55.
80.  SKOGAN  ET  AL.,  supra note  71,  at  30.
Latinos  were distinctly  concerned  about  gangs and  poor  people  about  the
physical  decay  of their  neighborhoods.  Concern  about  social  disorder  was
highest in  the  middle of the  income distribution-above  the neighborhoods
that were blighted  by  drugs  and gangs but below  the  best-off places, which
had fewer  problems  of all kinds  to report.
Id.
81.  Id. at  30-31.
82.  Id. at 29.
426THE NEW POLICING
specific needs  or areas.  In keeping with the  flexible,  community-
tailored  focus  of  the  CAPS  vision  of  community  policing,  the
makeup  of the committees  was  not established  centrally.  Rather,
committees  were  established  by  district  commanders,  based  on
their  view  of  the  most  appropriate  membership  for  the  district.
Committee  members  included  those  active  in  neighborhood
schools, businesses,  churches,  and other institutions  active in each
neighborhood.  Procedural  guidelines  such  as those  governing  se-
lection of officers, term limits, and voting rights, however, were es-
tablished by  the CAPS management  team.
There  are  organizational  implications  of emphasizing  accounta-
bility to neighborhoods.  The Chicago policing pushes much of the
responsibility in the organization  down to the beat officer, with an
expectation that other department resources  and personnel will as-
sist beat officers  in their new role.83  One  of the first responsibili-
ties  of  the  "beat  team'""  is  to  collect  beat-specific  information,
known  as a "beat profile,"  that  is compiled  as  a tool for problem-
solving and new  officer orientation.  A beat profile  includes infor-
mation on community organizations  and resources;  descriptions  of
problem  areas  and  abandoned  buildings; identification  of twenty-
four hour businesses,  bars, banks, and  schools; and other relevant
information  gathered  from  specialized  units,  such  as special  gang
units, with knowledge  of the beat.
Another  new  responsibility  shared  by  a  beat  team  is  docu-
menting  in a "beat plan"  the three or four key problems  they will
concentrate  on in a particular beat.  This focuses  attention  on the
issues until they are resolved, as well as the officers'  plans for solv-
ing the problems.86  In formulating the beat plans, officers are  ex-
pected  to  consider  resident  input  that  the  officers  gather  from
attendance  at  beat  meetings  (another  new  responsibility).  Al-
though the advantages  of the beat focus are obvious, one great dis-
advantage,  when  compared  to  the  New  York  system,  is  that
resources  at the  beat officer's  disposal may  be  too limited  to  ad-
dress  a crime problem that may be much larger than  a single beat.
At the same time, the Chicago approach invites the police to ad-
dress non-crime problems as well as crime.  The beat officer and his
83.  TOGETHER  WE  CAN:  A  STRATEGIC  PLAN  FOR  REINVENTING  THE  CHICAGO
POLICE  DEPARTMENT  17  (1993);  SKOGAN  ET  AL.,  supra note  71,  at  59.
84.  Beat  teams  consist of the  officers  who  work  in  the  same  beat  covering  all
three, eight-hour  shifts.  Each team  has roughly nine officers.  SKOGAN  ET  AL.,  supra
note 71,  at 60.
85.  Id.
86.  Id. at 41,  47.
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superiors focus on problem-solving, including community problems
that are not initially the responsibility  of the police, but are within
the control of the city government.  The police officer is  akin to an
ambassador  from  the central  government  of Chicago,  able to call
on other parts of the government  for a variety of services that can
improve  the  quality  of life  in  the  neighborhood  and  build social
capital  at the same  time.87
This  notion  of problem-solving,  which  is  addressed  to  a  wide
range  of problems of the neighborhood  as defined  by those living
there,  contrasts  importantly  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  rates  of
crime.  A broader focus would likely have  a less dramatic effect on
violent  crime rates, but more satisfactory  effects  in terms of com-
munity  acceptance  and, through that,  on rates  of fear.  However,
evidence  measuring  acceptance  by  the  community  and  the  effec-
tiveness  of the CAPS  program  is mixed.  Wesley  G.  Skogan led  a
research  effort to evaluate  the CAPS program, focusing on fifteen
of the  279 police beats.88  In terms of implementation  of problem-
solving, the overall assessment by the evaluation team determined
that  of the  fifteen  beats,  "four  were  doing  an  excellent  job, five
were  fielding  reasonable  programs,  two  were  struggling  to  make
the  grade  and  four failed  to  implement  much problem  solving  at
all."89  The reasons for relative  success or failure seem inextricably
connected  to  factors  such  as  the  personalities,  enthusiasm,  and
leadership  capabilities  of the officers.
The variations between the attitudes and efforts of the officers in
the  "worst"  and "best" beats, in terms of implementation  of prob-
lem-solving,  are  dramatic.  The  officers  and  sergeant  in the  beat
that  the  evaluation  labeled  as  the  "best"  actively  participated  in
beat team and community meetings; developed, implemented,  and
followed  through  with  problem-solving  strategies;  utilized  CAPS
procedures and city resources;  and responded to community priori-
ties.  Interestingly,  this  beat's  population  ranked  last  of  all  the
beats in terms of being supportive of the police.90  In great contrast,
the "worst"  beat team's sergeant and officers had negative or apa-
thetic perspectives  on  their capacity  to effect  change,  the  role  of
community beat meetings (seeing them as a forum for complaining
about the police), CAPS paperwork requirements, and community
policing  in  general  (viewing  it  as  public  relations).  Participation
87.  See id. at  36.
88.  Id. at 30.
89.  Id. at  191.
90.  Id. at  192-94.THE NEW POLICING
and  attendance  at beat team meetings  were sparse and  unproduc-
tive;  and  the  officers  and  sergeant  did  not  utilize  the  resources
available to them, and utilized CAPS procedures  only nominally, if
at  all.91  These  patterns  are  consistent  with the  other  "best"  and
"worst"  beats.92  Other  evidence  of citizen  reactions  is  discussed
after describing New York's new policing strategies.
2.  New  York
Wesley G. Skogan also had played an important role as an intel-
lectual  father  of  one  of the  three  central  characteristics  of  New
York's policing.  It was his argument in the 1990 book Disorder  and
Decline93 that gave credibility to a groundbreaking article by James
Q.  Wilson  and  George  L. Kelling,  The Police and Neighborhood
Safety: Broken Windows, published in the Atlantic Monthly almost
two decades  ago.94  The central  argument of Broken Windows was
that disorderly conduct on public streets, something which  the po-
lice certainly can control, can undermine social control by frighten-
ing,  or  otherwise  discouraging,  responsible  citizens  from  being  in
public places  and, at the same time, can encourage  criminals to be-
lieve  that crime  would be  safe  because  "obviously,  no  one  at the
scene of disorder  cares. '95  The exaggerated  perceptions  of danger
created by disorder were, in themselves,  a costly source of fear that
disturbed urban living.
As a matter that was  secondary in theory but, perhaps, primary
in  practice,  "Broken  Windows"  policing  also  justified  very  large
numbers  of "frisks"  and misdemeanor  arrests,  which had the twin
benefits  of making the illegal carrying  of guns far more  risky  and
increasing  stops of dangerous  people  who  were  wanted for other
reasons.  The case for Broken Windows policing thus relies on both
the fact that disorder creates fear and fear eliminates social control,
inviting activities  that may only take place in the absence of social
control, and the fact that focusing on disorderly offenses allows  and
invites  aggressive street policing.
This  model  is  a  form  of problem-solving  policing, intended  to
build social control  as well  as to  use the capacities  that the police
already have to deal with dangerous people.  At the same time, it is
unlike the Chicago  plan in its lack  of dependence  on any form  of
91.  Id. at  194-95.
92.  See id. at  195-205.
93.  SKOGAN  ET  AL.,  supra note 71.
94.  Wilson  & Kelling, supra note 50.
95.  Id.
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fact-finding to determine  a neighborhood's  definition  of problems
or any major effort to encourage community participation  in their
solution.  The New  York style of policing  involves  far more  inde-
pendent problem-solving  by the police than Chicago's  policing, al-
though  one  of  its  pillars  is  the  belief,  deeply  embedded  in  the
Broken Windows theory, that disorder is a major  concern of most
responsible  people in any neighborhood.96
While the Broken Windows theory that undergirds this strand of
New  York's  strategy  has  won  nearly  universal  acclaim  among
scholars,97 it has not been without detractors.  One especially effec-
tive critic has been Professor Bernard E. Harcourt.  In a  1998 arti-
cle  in  the  Michigan Law  Review,  Harcourt  replicated  Skogan's
analysis and took issue with many of his conclusions.  Specifically,
he found that certain types of crimes, including  rape, purse snatch-
ing, and pickpocketing, are simply not significantly  related to levels
of disorder.98  Moreover,  most  other types  of crime  were  not re-
lated at a statistically significant  level  when poverty, stability,  and
race were held constant.99  Harcourt similarly took issue with other
empirical  evidence  cited  by  proponents  of the  Broken  Windows
theory,1 00  concluding  that  the  data  simply  do  not  support  the
hypothesis.'
A  second  major  strand in New York's  policing strategies  is  the
energetic,  imaginative  use  of the  full  range  of police powers  and
96.  E.g.,  Randy  Kennedy  &  Alan  Feuer,  Watchful  vs.  Worried; Crime Evokes
City's Bad Old Days, But Not Old Fears, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2000, § 1, at 27 (noting
that  the Broken Windows  theory, which posits  a  close  link between  crime and  low-
level  civic  disorder,  has been  a  "big  influence  on  the  style  of  policing that  evolved
under  [Mayor Rudolph]  Giuliani").
97.  Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influ-
ence Conception of Deterrence,  The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New  York  Style,  97 MicH.  L. REV.  291,  293  (1998)  (stating  that "it  is today
practically  impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the quality-
of-life  initiative.  It stands,  in  essence,  uncontested-even  in  the  legal academy").
98.  Id. at 327.
99.  Id. at  327-28  (finding  no significant  relationship  between  disorder  and  both
burglary  and  physical  assault).  Indeed,  robbery  was  the  only  crime significantly  re-
lated to disorder, once poverty, race, and stability were held constant. But, when Har-
court  removed  a  cluster  of  five  Newark  neighborhoods  from  the  data,  and  held
poverty,  race,  and stability constant,  he  found no relationship  between disorder  and
robbery  victimization. Id. at  328-29.
100.  Id. at  329-31 (finding  inconclusive  a similar study on the relationship  between
crime and disorder)  (citing Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline  Cohen, Deterrent  Effects
of the Police on Crime: A  Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & Soc. REV.
163  (1988));  Harcourt, supra note  97,  at  331-39  (suggesting  a  number  of factors,  as
alternatives to the quality of life initiative,  that explain the decline  in New York City's
crime rates).
101.  Harcourt, supra note  97, at  331.
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capacities to deal with crime problems as they arise.  Deputy  Com-
missioner  Jack  Maple  described  the four crucial  steps of an effec-
tive  police  strategy  as  accurate  and  timely  intelligence,  rapid
deployment,  effective  tactics,  and  relentless follow-up  and  assess-
ment. 1 0 2  A  crime  problem  might  be  solved by  moving  more  of-
ficers into the area, by addressing its causes, by putting pressure on
people  subject to arrest  and conviction to provide evidence, by re-
ducing  safe  opportunities  for  crime,  or  in  any  of  a  dozen  other
ways.  The object of this second strand of New York policing is to
ensure that every  alternative use of every available police capacity
is considered in order to promptly address what has been identified
as  a significant crime problem.
The  third notable strand of New York  policing is the  much  ad-
mired  and,  in fact,  remarkable  system of management  by results
called  Compstat. °3  To  ensure  the  conditions  of  the  second
strand-early  identification  of the problems, careful  and  imagina-
tive  review  of  tactics  involving  all  police  capacities,  and  very
prompt  response-requires  assisting  precinct  commanders  with
ideas  and,  in the New  York  strategy,  powerfully  motivating  them
with the risk of embarrassment  or, worse, loss of the command of a
precinct.  Both  of these  objectives  are accomplished  by  requiring
each of the  seventy-five  precinct commanders  to  appear at  a very
large  meeting  of headquarters  staff,  other  precinct  commanders,
and  prosecutors  and be  prepared  to be  examined  on any adverse
change  in crime statistics in the precinct and to discuss what is  be-
ing  done  about it.'04  The  pressure  is  substantial,  and  may be  un-
necessary. °5  Part of New York's  message  may be simply  that the
precinct  commander  should  take  steps to  release  and  encourage
the  natural  inclinations  of  the  police  officers  to  go  after  crime
aggressively.
Although close  cooperation with neighborhood  groups and reli-
ance  on neighborhood  leadership has not been  a focus of the new
policing in New York, there occasionally have  been experiments in
these areas.  Even at its most responsive  to communities, however,
102.  Jack Maple, Editorial, Brutality Isn't Part of New  Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1997,  § 13,  at  17.
103.  David  C. Anderson,  Crime Stoppers, N.Y.  TIMES  MAG.,  Feb. 9,  1997,  at  47
(describing  how each  precinct's  crime  statistics  are  electronically  inputted  into  the
Compstat system each  week, allowing senior officials  to analyze  police  and criminal
activity  throughout  the  city in  a timely  fashion).
104.  Id.
105.  Boston's management  system  examines what is happening  and what  could be
done  in  a far  less confrontational  way.
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it has never  approached  the aims or practices  of Chicago's  CAPS
program.
3.  Results in New  York and Chicago
What do we know about  the results in New York  and Chicago?
The  experiences  in both cases remind  us that results on the street
may depart from strategies.  Sometimes  Chicago could not develop
neighborhood policing in one beat, although it was successful  in an
adjacent  beat.  New York  has experienced  a number  of very dra-
matic  and inflammatory instances of police  abuse, which were  cer-
tainly  not  planned  as  part  of  its  strategy, °6  and  its  efforts  at
developing  creative community  relations  in the  75th Precinct  also
seem  exceptional  and  far  from  integral  to  its  core  strategies.
1 0 7
Moreover, in each case,  the studies  evaluating each city's  new po-
licing approach were conducted within a very few years of the initi-
ation of the strategy; that may be too soon to know  the long-term
consequences.  But it  is  important to  look  at  what  we know  now
about two dimensions: effectiveness  in reducing crime  and the abil-
ity  of  the  police  to  develop  trust  within  the  community  being
policed.
In  1998,  two  arms of the  Department  of Justice  (the  Office  of
Community-Oriented  Policing  Services  and the  Bureau of Justice
Statistics)  produced  a groundbreaking  victimization  survey  of re-
sidents of twelve cities, including Chicago  and New York. °8  Ques-
tions went both to the level of crime, fear, and disorder and to the
attitudes of citizens  toward the police.
New  York had more  serious  crime  problems  than  Chicago  but
was  making more progress in dealing with them.  In 1998, Chicago
106.  E.g.,  Jeffrey  Rosen,  Excessive Force, THE  NEW  REPUBLIC,  Apr.  10,  2000,  at
2427 (suggesting that defenders of the zero tolerance policy against crime believe that
it  has  an  inevitable  side  effect  of  aggressive  policing);  George  L. Kelling,  Policing
Under Fire, WALL  ST.  J.,  Mar. 23,  1999,  at  22 (suggesting  that  "root-cause  liberals"
feel that police perhaps can reduce crime, but only at  a cost of abusing citizens); Jack
Newfield,  Rudy, It's Time to Listen to This Voice of Reason, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16,  1999,
at 20 (quoting Urban League  President Dennis Walcott as saying that "there needs  to
be a balance between  aggressive police work and respect for civil liberties  and dignity
of the people who get stopped and searched");  Liza Mundy, Broken Windows, WASH.
POST  MAG.,  June  11,  2000,  at 4  (commenting that ordinary  citizens  are  appalled  at
how aggressive  policing  led  to the shooting deaths of two unarmed  black men).
107.  Harvey Simon  & John Buntin,  The East  New  York  Urban Youth  Corps  and
Community Policing:  A New Initiative in the "Dead Zone" (1999)  (unpublished  man-
uscript  written  for  John  F.  Kennedy  School  of  Government  Case  Program);  John
Buntin, The Community Security Initiative Gets Underway (1998)  (unpublished  man-
uscript written for John F.  Kennedy  School  of Government  Case Program).
108.  COMMUNITY  SAFETY,  supra note  13.THE NEW POLICING
had 68 violent victimizations per 1000 residents twelve-years-old  or
older;  in  New  York,  there  were  far  more,  with  a  rate  of 85  per
1000.109  The  black  violent  victimization  rate  in  Chicago  in  1998
was 50 per 1000  citizens for violent crime;  in New York it was  123
per 1000.110  A violent victimization in New York was almost twice
as  likely  to  involve  a  weapon.111  But  during the  period  1993-97,
homicides  in Chicago  decreased  by  about  10%.112  In New York,
homicides  declined  by  more  than  60%  from  26.5  per  100,000  to
10.5 per  100,000.113
In both Chicago  and New York in 1998, residents were far more
likely to fear  crime  in their city than  in their neighborhood  or on
their street.'14  Obviously,  the likelihood  fears are exaggerated in-
creases as firsthand evidence declines.  Both in respondents'  neigh-
borhoods  and  in  their  cities,  there  was  slightly  more  fear  in
Chicago than  in New York.115  Moreover, 25%  of the respondents
in Chicago  said  they were  more frightened  than  they had been  a
few  years  earlier  while  only  15%  in  New  York  were  more
frightened.
116
As might be expected  with Broken Windows policing, a  slightly
smaller percentage  of the population in New York reported public
drinking or drug use, public drug sales, vandalism, graffiti, prostitu-
tion, and panhandling in their neighborhood. 117  In Chicago,  36%
of the residents said that conditions  of disorder or activities  of the
sort I have just described made them feel less safe." 8  This was true
of only 29%  in New York.119
Meanwhile, 74%  of the residents in Chicago reported themselves
either  very  or  somewhat  fearful  of crime  in their  city.120  Only  a
somewhat smaller figure, 68%, reported  the same  in New York.' 2'
While  most  people  in  both  cities  felt  that  their  fear  had  not
109.  Id. at iv.
110.  Id. at  3 tbl.1.
111.  Id. at  5 tbl.5.
112.  Id. at  9.
113.  Id.
114.  Id. at  10.
115.  Id.
116.  Id. at  12  tbl.1M.
117.  Id. at  15 tbl.16.
118.  Id. at  16 tbl.17.
119.  Id.
120.  Id. at  18 tbl.20.
121.  Id.
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changed much, there was  a somewhat greater percentage  of those
who felt reduced fear in New York. a 1 2
Reports on trust-building relations with the police  were also  re-
vealing, but cut  the  other way:  67%  of residents  in  Chicago  and
only  51%  of New York residents  said the police were  doing com-
munity  policing.123  Perhaps  relatedly,  38%  of  Chicagoans,  com-
pared  to  23%  of  New  Yorkers,  had  heard  about  a  meeting
concerning  crime  in their neighborhood  in  1998.124  Along  all the
following dimensions, a somewhat higher percentage of those from
Chicago, than from New York, had contact with the police:  casual
conversation,  calling  the police  for service,  providing information
to  the  police,  reporting  a  crime  to  the  police,  asking  for  advice
from  the police,  and  participating  in community  activity  with the
police.125  A significantly higher percentage of New York residents
felt there was an increased  police presence in their neighborhood;
it just took a different form.1
2 6
The Chicago police elicited more satisfied reactions from the vic-
tims  of violent  crimes  than  New  York  police  and  a  significantly
higher  percentage  of Chicago  residents  said  that the  police  were
doing  a  lot of work  with  the  neighborhood  residents  to  prevent
crime  and safety problems. 27  This is  far more at the heart of the
Chicago strategy than the New York strategy.  In Chicago, 73%  of
city residents were familiar with the term "community  policing,
1 28
as  compared  to  just  50%  of  New  Yorkers,  a  revealing  fact  in
itself.'
29
One survey question combined concern about crime and concern
about the police.  Residents  in both cities were very satisfied  with
local police.130  Not  surprisingly, blacks in both  Chicago  and New
York were  less satisfied  with the local  police than were  whites. 31
But despite  several notorious  incidents  of police  brutality in New
York, blacks  there  were  more satisfied  with the local  police than
were blacks  in Chicago,  by a margin of 77%  to 69%.132
122.  Id.
123.  Id. at  28.
124.  Id. at  22  tbl.26.
125.  Id. at  23 tbl.20.
126.  Id. at  24 tbl.31.
127.  Id. at  24 tbl.32.
128.  Id.
129. Id.
130.  BUREAU  OF  JUSTICE  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  SOURCEBOOK  OF
CRIMINAL  JUSTICE  STATISTICS  1998, at  110 tbl.2.27  (1999).
131.  Id.
132.  COMMUNITY  SAFETY,  supra note 13,  at 25  tbl.34.THE NEW POLICING
B.  Boston
Boston  was  not  part  of  the  Department  of Justice  survey  of
twelve  cities.  Its  strategies  are  different  from  those  of both  New
York  and  Chicago-different  not  only  in  attempting  to  combine
parts of the  strategies  of each other  city, but also  in making very
different use of problem-solving  than New York and a very differ-
ent  use  of  neighborhood  cooperation  than  Chicago.  The  rate  of
homicide  reduction  in Boston in the 1990s was nearly  as dramatic
as that in New York.133
It is worth reviewing the events  that led Boston to  embrace the
community-policing  model.  Already  widely  criticized  for  overly
aggressive  street  patrols,  in the  late  1980s the  Boston Police  De-
partment encountered public outrage when it was revealed that of-
ficers,  faced  with  the  sudden  emergence  of  crack  cocaine,  were
indiscriminately  stopping  and  searching  young  black  men.  The
"stop and  frisk"  scandal came to  a head in the fall of 1989,  when,
based on widespread suspicion that police  routinely used unconsti-
tutional searches  and seizures,  a Dorchester judge suppressed  evi-
dence  he believed had been obtained  improperly.1
3 1
That same year, Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was mur-
dered near a largely African American part of Boston.135  Her hus-
band  Charles,  a  witness  to  the  crime,  reported  that  an  African
American male committed the murder.  Based  on this account, the
Boston Police Department aggressively  pursued suspects from the
area, eventually eliciting witness  statements that incriminated  a lo-
cal  black  resident.  These  charges  were  shown  to  be  false  when
Charles  Stuart was  later implicated  as the murderer.  Stuart killed
himself  before  the  investigation  could  be  completed.  The  wide-
spread reports  of police abuse, coupled  with the appearance  of ra-
cism  within  the  department,  exacerbated  public  hostility  towards
the police, particularly  within the African  American  community.
133.  Fox  Butterfield,  Cities Reduce  Crime and Conflict Without New  York-Style
Hardball,  N.Y. TIMES,  Mar. 4,  2000, at Al  (noting that, according  to Professor Blum-
stein, New York's homicide rate fell 70.6%  from 1991 to 1998, while Boston's rate fell
69.3%  during the same period).
134.  E.g.,  Doris Sue  Wong,  Search-on-Sight  Judged Illegal, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Aug.
30,  1989,  at  B1  (reporting  that  Suffolk  Superior  Court  Judge  Cortland  A.  Mathers
dismissed weapons  possession  indictments  against  two suspected  gang members, be-
cause  the  evidence  seized pursuant  to  the search-on-sight  policy  had  been illegally
obtained).
135.  E.g., Michael  Rezendes, Mayor's Reputation as Racial Healer Gets Some  Tar-
nish, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Sept.  10,  1991,  at  1.
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Recognizing  that it needed approaches  that were more effective
and less  divisive, the Boston Police Department implemented  a va-
riety  of problem-solving  and  community-policing  strategies.  The
most  notable  problem-solving  strategy  in  Boston  is  what  David
Kennedy, of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment,  has  called  "Pulling  Levers. '136  In  contrast  to  Broken
Windows, it has not made misdemeanor arrests or stop and frisks a
key to reduced homicides by increasing  the risks of carrying guns,
the most lethal weapon.  Pulling Levers is  instead based on a form
of deterrence  that  is  new and yet  grounded  in a very old theory.
For some centuries, it has been accepted that certainty and swift-
ness of punishment are more likely to be effective in changing con-
duct  than  longer  penalties  imposed  without  certainty  or  speed.
This  may be  particularly  true  for youthful,  violent  offenders  who
are likely to discount sharply both the chance of getting caught and
the costs of future punishment  and who may know little about ac-
tual  punishments.  Working  with  the  Boston  police,  Kennedy
found, from a careful review of homicide files, that violence in Bos-
ton  was  heavily  concentrated,  on  both  the  perpetrator's  and  the
victim's  side,  in gang  members  and  among  those with  long arrest
records.137 Kennedy also found, not surprisingly, that the identities
of  youth  with  these  characteristics  were  well-known  to  the  po-
lice.1 38  (In fact,  police  in  many  cities  believe  that the  number  of
dangerous  perpetrators  is  relatively  small and  that their identities
are known.)
The Boston police discovered  that youth in the dangerous cate-
gories potentially  were subject to a  large number of sanctions  and
inconveniences  of one sort  or another.  In Kennedy's  words:
The  Boston  Gun  Project Working  Group  observed  that  gangs
and gang  members left themselves  open  to an enormous range
of sanctions, exactly because they were so highly criminal.  Gang
members committed large numbers of crimes that were open to
ready police enforcement:  they sold drugs on the street and they
committed  large numbers of disorder offenses  like drinking and
using drugs in public, trespassing, and the like.  Gangs and gang
members  were often the subject of longer-term enforcement  at-
tention, such  as  undercover  drug investigations ....  They were
frequently  on  probation,  sometimes  on  parole,  and  they  rou-
tinely  violated  their conditions  of probation  and  parole,  which
136.  David  M. Kennedy,  Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings,
and a Theory of Prevention, 31  VAL.  U.  L.  REV.  449  (1997).
137.  Id. at 452.
138.  Id.
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could  include  curfews,  area  restrictions,  restrictions  on  how
many  and  which  people  they  could  associate  with, abstinence
from alcohol and other drugs, and the like.  They were often out
on  bail  awaiting  trial  or  sentencing,  with  similar  conditions
which  were  similarly  frequently  violated.  Juvenile  offenders
were  often under formal Department  of Youth Services  (DYS)
supervision  but  still  living  in the  community.  And  gangs  and
gang members were often implicated in large numbers of "cold"
cases  such  as unsolved  assaults  and homicides.' 39
Therefore, the threat of swift and certain sanctions could be con-
veyed  in  person  to  the  individuals  whose  conduct  had  to  be
changed.  Absent evidence of a serious crime, which could be diffi-
cult to find, the police  otherwise  might not be  able to prevent  all
the  anti-social  or  criminal  conduct  of  an  individual  specifically
warned  of the  amount  of attention  and  the range  of sanctions  to
which he would be subject.  But the sanctions proved adequate  to
prevent any particular type of conduct, for example, violence.  In-
deed, violence  often may  be  something  that  young people  would
like to avoid if it would be possible to do so without losing face.  In
any event, violent activity was less important and more easily aban-
doned than profit-making activities,  which would be threatened  by
police attention.
Thus, the overall strategy is clear and persuasive.  If, as was true
in Boston, an identifiable group of individuals is known or reasona-
bly believed to be responsible for a large percentage of a particular
type of crime, and if they are individually subject to a wide range of
sanctions, then it should be possible to prevent them from engaging
in any type of criminal behavior that is not of central importance to
them  by  making  clear,  in  face-to-face  contact,  that  all  available
sanctions  will be brought to  bear if they engage  in the prohibited
conduct.  Violent youth fall within  that category, as  do the crimes
of  violence  that  Boston  was  determined  to  stop.  The  strategy
would work so long as the critical neighborhoods-those that were
home to the youth subject to highly specific and threatening orders
to give up violence-were  supportive and did not regard the polic-
ing  strategy  as  unfair  or  discriminatory.  Finding  that  support,
which  New  York had done  much less  well, was  one  of the objec-
tives of the  other, neighborhood-based,  part of Boston's policing
strategy.
Crucial  to Boston's  efforts  to  develop  community  support  was
the police  department's  partnership  with the Ten  Point  Coalition
139.  Id. at  461  (citation  omitted).
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(the  "Coalition"),  a prominent  group of local  black clergy,  mem-
bers of which had made a name for themselves by taking their min-
istries  to  Boston's most  dangerous  streets.' 40  Despite  historically
tense relations,  the two groups  began to  work together once  they
recognized  their mutual need:  the ministers'  attempts to reach at-
risk youth  were undermined  by committed  offenders  who contin-
ued to run  the streets, while  the police  department's  plans to  im-
plement  community-based  strategies  depended  on  the
participation  and acceptance  of community  members  who did not
trust them.  Much of Boston's success in lowering crime and devel-
oping  community  support  arises  from  the  credibility  the  depart-
ment developed by virtue of its association with the Coalition.  This
credibility  has  endured  in large part because  the  Coalition,  while
cooperative,  has  remained  a  distinct  entity  not afraid  to  criticize
police  action.141  As  a  community  watchdog,  the  Coalition  has
helped  keep  the  police  accountable  and  deterred  abuses  akin  to
those  that have plagued  New York in recent years.
The  community-based  activities,  which  are  an  integral  part  of
Boston's strategy, can be illustrated by practices  in the Dorchester
neighborhood,  a  policing precinct of which  the Boston police  are
particularly proud.  They take two forms:  (1) modes of serious and
continuous  consultation  with  citizens;  and  (2)  demonstrations  of
concern  for the well-being  of young people  getting in trouble,  in-
stead  of just recrimination.
Serious consultation began with citywide  strategic planning with
local  priorities to be  set by teams in each police  district that were
led  by the  district commander,  but the membership  of which  was
divided  between  police  and  concerned,  involved  citizens.  Real
power  was  devolved  from  headquarters  so  that  the  district  com-
mander  could  work  in close  association  with citizen  stakeholders.
In the Dorchester  district,  for  example,  Captain Robert  Dunford
gives his neighborhood advisory  council significant influence,  even
over  budget  allocations  and  patrol plans. 142  Within  each  district,
140.  E.g.,  Charles  A.  Radin  & Jamal  E.  Watson, Activists Revisit Gang Strategy:
Some See Complacency As  Youth  Violence Increases In Boston, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Sep.
5,  2000, at Al.
141.  E.g., Judy Rakowsky, Black Leaders Assail Martin, Urge Tougher Hate-Crimes
Efforts; DA  Defends Office's Record, Rebuts Report, BOSTON  GLOBE,  June 14,  2000,
at  B3  (explaining  that  Coalition  member  Rev. Eugene Rivers  criticized  police  for a
1997  change  of policy in  classifying hate crimes).
142.  The two paragraphs that follow draw on Evan S. Reynolds, Neighborhood  Po-
licing in  Boston: A Dorchester  Case Study  9-13,  23-36 (Apr. 30,  1999)  (unpublished
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"team  leaders"  are  assigned  specific  responsibility  for the unique
problems of a particular  beat.
The neighborhood  orientation in Dorchester is maintained  on a
daily basis by four community service officers,  each of whom is as-
signed to interact with neighborhood  groups in a particular  beat-
explaining, learning, relaying concerns, and recruiting participation
in  a shared  "Project  Safeguard"  to  provide  neighborhood  safety.
Finally, even prosecution  is made  subject to  community influence
in still another program, the Dorchester  Safe Neighborhood  Initia-
tive, which  is counseled  in part by an advisory  board consisting of
local  residents  as well  as police  and prosecutors.
The  second  strand  of Boston's strategy  is  a demonstrated  con-
cern for the well-being  of youth already getting into trouble.  What
the Boston police avoid is a sense that they are the dangerous ene-
mies  of all but the well-behaved  among youth in struggling  neigh-
borhoods.  Adopting the mixed concerns of relatives of youth who
form  much  of the  community, the police are determined  to make
the  life  of  salvageable  youth  better, not  harder.  Thus,  Commis-
sioner Paul Evans  uses a federal block grant to pay for clinical  so-
cial  workers,  who  are  attached  to  police  districts  such  as
Dorchester,  to advise,  support,  and  introduce  to  useful  programs
those  youth who  have  been referred  to  them  by  police.143  They
maintain  confidentiality  and  appear  in court  for the youth where
this  seems appropriate  to  the case.  Districts  like  Dorchester  also
have juvenile justice "roundtables"  that involve the police, district
attorney, schools,  social services,  and others in regular discussions
of what  is happening  in the lives  of certain  troubled  youth in  an
effort  to  find  help  for  them  and  to  coordinate  governmental
responses.144
The  Boston  strategy  had  organizational  implications.  While
some  New  York  precinct  commanders  found  Compstat  meetings
harsh and threatening, Commissioner Evans expected district com-
manders in Boston to carry  out their plans  in highly  decentralized
ways, and that was communicated  through  meetings that were less
confrontational  than those in New York.1 45  His role  was to decide
whether to approve  a plan and then  support and  monitor it.
143.  Id. at 14-15.
144.  Id. at 20-23.
145.  Id. at  3  (reporting that  Commissioner  Evans pursued  decentralization  as  an
avenue  toward accountability).
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In sum, by taking a hard line against those individuals who com-
mit  most  crime,  and  working  in  tandem  with  critical  neighbor-
hoods, Boston was  able to  achieve  dramatic  crime reductions.
C.  England and Wales
One final strategy, distinct but related to those I have described,
deserves  attention  as well, for it combines central  elements  of all
three  strategies  discussed  thus  far.  Like  Chicago's  strategy,  the
crime legislation introduced  by British Prime Minister Tony Blair's
Labour Party relies  powerfully on the wishes  of neighborhood  re-
sidents  and  depends  upon  them  to  initiate  action. 146  Like  New
York, Britian  focuses  attention  on disorderly  and  fear-generating
actions that are threatening to individuals; but instead of using stat-
utes that broadly prohibit a type of conduct (such as drinking alco-
holic  beverages  on  the  street),  Britain  has  turned  to  far  more
specific requirements  that are addressed only to certain named  in-
dividuals.1 47  Like Boston's strategy, the new provisions  specifically
target troublesome  individuals who are not subject to present pros-
ecution because of lack of evidence  of an immediate  crime.148  But
the  British prohibitions  include  efforts  to  deter  behavior  far  less
serious  than  the  lethal  violence  that  was  the  target  of  Boston's
strategy.
149
England  and Wales'  Crime and Disorder Act of 1998150  creates
something called an "anti-social behavior order."  Either the police
or the local government can apply for such an order from a magis-
trate's  court.  The  defendant  does  not have  to  be  present  at  the
proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal and operate under
a preponderance  of the evidence rule.  If the defendant is found to
have acted "in  a manner that caused, or was likely to cause harass-
ment, or alarm, or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household  as himself"  and  if the  defendant  cannot  establish  that
his  or her  behavior  was  reasonable  in the  circumstances,  a  court
order to protect the people in the local government area for a mini-
146.  Andrew  Rutherford,  An  Elephant on the Doorstep: Criminal Policy Without
Crime in New Labour's Britian,  in CRIMINAL  POLICY  IN TRANSITION  36, 64 (P. Green
& A. Rutherford  eds.,  forthcoming  2000).
147. Id. at 37.
148.  Id. at 66-67.
149.  E.g.,  Russell Jenkins,  Peeping Tom Jailed Under New  Law, TIMES  (London),
June 23, 2000,  at 7 (describing  a mandatory jail sentence  for subsequent  crimes  com-
mitted  by sex offenders, who are  required by the Crime and  Disorder Act to register
with  law enforcement).
150.  Crime and  Disorder Act  1998, Royal  Assent 27  (1999).
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mum of two years (with no maximum)  is  to be issued, prohibiting
the individual from doing anything or being anywhere described in
the order.  Violating  the  order without  a reasonable  excuse  is  an
indictable offense, which carries as much as a five-year prison term.
There  is  no  requirement  that  the  defendant  have  intended  to
harass or to cause alarm and distress.  Nor is there any requirement
that  the  alarm or  distress  be  "serious."  Moreover,  the  activities
giving  rise to  the order  are  intended to  be  broader than  the  acts
prohibited  by the criminal  law.  In effect,  a magistrate's court can
deal with people it determines to be engaged  in frightening behav-
ior by developing an injunctive  law of its own, a violation of which
is  punishable  criminally.  The  primary  explanation  for  bypassing
general  requirements  of the criminal  law in this way  is that there
are  courses  of  conduct  that  involve  an  accumulation  of  events,
none of which  is itself criminal but which together warrant  severe
measures.'  The resulting deterrence  is even more specific and fo-
cused than  Boston's Pulling  Levers.
HI.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  LEGITIMACY
How could  anyone complain about such imaginative  and appar-
ently successful  policing  as has  taken place,  for example,  in New
York?  The  answer  is  that, in exchange  for quite  remarkable  im-
provements  in  personal  security,  we  are  accepting  reductions  in
democratic  control  and  thus  the  legitimacy  of  the  purposes  for
which the powers  of the police can be used.  We  are endorsing  sig-
nificant reductions  in  control over  the  discretion  of the police  in
choosing specific targets.  We are moving toward a regime of polic-
ing where the notions of equal protection have limited force on the
ground.  We  also  increasingly  are finding that probable  cause  and
reasonable suspicion  as predicates  for detention and search are be-
ing eroded,  and  that the very determination  of what  conduct  will
be permitted and what form of disorder  is subject to prompt sanc-
tions is left in far larger part to the police.  Therefore,  this evalua-
tion must count the costs as well as the considerable benefits of the
new  policing.
A.  The Problem  of the Democratic  Legitimacy  of the  Goals  for
which  Police  Powers  are Used
In describing the successes  of the new policing, I have  implicitly
assumed  that  its  goal  was  to  reduce  serious  crime  on  a  citywide
151.  Rutherford, supra note  146,  at 63.
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basis.  It is time to examine  whether this is, in fact,  accepted as the
goal of the new policing and, if not, what is?  Indeed, a prior ques-
tion remains  unanswered:  who is to set the  goals?
1.  The Inevitability of Discretion
To be clear at the start, the police have many responsibilities be-
yond  reducing  crime.  They  prevent  fights,  regulate  demonstra-
tions,  enforce  traffic  regulations,  engage  in  rescue  or  other
assistance, and much more.  I have focused on the crime reduction
benefits of the new policing  and the neighborhood  trust that it can
induce because these have  been the major subjects  of attention in
bringing about the changes  that have  occurred  since  1990,  not be-
cause  they  are  the  only  significant  functions  of a modern,  urban
police department.  Second, unavoidably there  are  critical  choices
to be  made  as  to goals,  even  in the  more limited  area  of dealing
with the effects  of crime on continuing  danger, public fear, social
control in neighborhoods,  and public resentment of disorder.
Governments  of  civil  law  countries  from  Argentina  to France
and Germany sometimes  act as if there is not a serious question as
to the purposes for which police powers like those described  above
can be used, contending that the police officer is obligated to arrest
whenever he sees a crime and then to take investigative steps at the
order of a judge whom the officer, carrying out another  legal obli-
gation,  must notify  immediately  of the  crime  and  the  suspect. 152
Thus, in 1999, Klaus Hubmann, the senior public prosecutor in Nu-
remberg, Germany, explained that he had no choice but to investi-
gate  a  failed  attempt  fifty-three  years  earlier  by  two  Jewish
survivors  of the  Holocaust  to  poison members  of Adolf  Hitler's
SS,153  Hubmann  explained  that  political  or  moral  aspects  could
play  no part  in the  decision.  Civil  law  countries  deny  that  their
police have the discretion, so readily accepted in the United States,
not only to decline to arrest in very sympathetic situations but also
to develop imaginative  uses of police powers for such purposes  as
reducing disorder, preventing violence, building social control, and
152.  E.g.,  Richard  S.  Frase  &  Thomas  Weigend,  German Criminal Justice as  a
Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems,  Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L &
COMP.  L. REV.  317, 337  n.135  (1995)  (noting that "German  police have  no legal dis-
cretion to drop  or to refrain  from investigating  arguably  criminal cases").
153.  Louise  Potterton,  Germany Pursues Holocaust Avengers,  SUN.  TELEGRAPH
(London),  Oct.  10,  1999,  at 7.
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carrying  out  whatever  are  the  wishes  of  members  of  .a
community.1
54
This denial of discretion  is surely  a fiction in almost every coun-
try  in  the  world.  The  police  officer  is forced  to  decide  on what
occasions  he or she should use these powers for two major reasons.
First, in every country, what crimes  an officer will be in a position
to act upon depend upon where the officer is and what he or she is
looking  for,  and  this  involves  discretion.  Second,  if  the  officer
comes  upon  a  minor  matter  that  is  criminal,  he  has  to  decide
whether it is worth his time, and the time of prosecutors and judi-
cial  officials,  to  process  the matter.  In the  United States,  we  are
very frank about such uses of judgment or discretion by individual
police officers or, sometimes, by the police department  in the form
of directives to  officers.
In  short, it is  wholly  implausible  to assume  that the goal in the
United States is to enforce all the criminal statutes enacted by state
and federal legislatures.  The larger part of violations of the law by
270  million  Americans  must  be  ignored  by  the  fewer  than  one
million  police, who  do  not have  time  to  investigate  matters they
consider unimportant. 55  Moreover, these officers  know that pros-
ecutors and judges will lack the capacity to try cases if all the small
matters are brought to court, and that juries  are likely  to reject  as
excessive  the use of the criminal law in those cases.  We have come
to assume that even statutes recently passed by a concerned legisla-
ture  will be applied with discretion  as to  their use.156
2.  Traditional Understandings  and New  Choices
It is how this discretion  is used-not any novelty or recognition
of  the  need  for  it-that  has  taken  new  shape  as  policing  has
154.  E.g.,  Richard  S.  Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We
Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542,  555-57 (1990)  (noting that France requires "supervisory-
level approval"  for certain creative uses of police power "which  American law gener-
ally permits any police  officer to undertake  on his or her  own").
155.  Cf U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU,  Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www  (providing  the population  of  the United  States  as  276,351,651)  (current
through  Dec.  19,  2000);  U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU,  SURVEY  OF  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT
AND  PAYROLL 1999, U.S.  SUMMARY  TABLE  (providing  the total number  of police in
the United  States), http://www.census.gov/govs/www/apesst/99.html.
156.  E.g.,  Task  Force  on  Federalization  of Criminal  Law,  The Federalization of
Criminal  Law, 11 FED. SENTENCING  REP. 194, 194 (Jan./Feb. 1999)  ("[The Task Force]
looked systematically at whether new federal  criminal laws, which were popular when
enacted,  are  being enforced.  It determined, based  on obvious data,  that in many  in-
stances  they are not.").
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changed.  Until  a  few decades  ago,  it was  understood  that  police
discretion-use  of limited police resources-would  be rationed by
the  seriousness  of the  conduct  that was  being  investigated.  This
seriousness  was in turn dictated  by the people's  representatives  in
the legislature, who used sentencing  levels to express  their relative
disapproval  of criminal conduct.  The  assumption,  in other words,
was that there  was  a direct  correlation  between  the sentence  im-
posed  and  the  citizenry's  view  (as  expressed  through  its  elected
representatives)  of the relative seriousness of the conduct.  As long
as police relied  upon sentences  as guidelines  to seriousness-and,
for the most part, they did-there was  a strong democratic compo-
nent  to  their enforcement  decisions.  Thus,  police  ignored  minor,
regulatory  offenses  or left them  underpoliced  and,  therefore,  un-
derdetected.  The  measures  of police  performance  we  developed,
focusing on FBI statistics  as to a few serious crimes, also  reflected
that judgment.  In recent  decades,  the focus  has come  to include,
besides punishing individual crimes, incapacitating dangerous crim-
inal  groups  ranging  from  organized  crime  to  terrorists  to  street
gangs.  But what  qualified  a group for  attention was  still the seri-
ousness of the conduct  in which  it engaged:  political violence,  or-
ganized  street  violence,  corruption  of officials,  intimidation,  and
extortion.
Both traditional assumptions  about the goals or ends of policing
and assumptions  about  how the available  means or powers  will be
used to  accomplish whatever  goals  are chosen  have been  brought
into question by the new policing.  Leaving changes in assumptions
about means  until later,  we  should focus  first  on the  question  of
legitimacy  of goals.
Consider  the  issues  presented  by  problem-solving  policing.
What  problems  should  be  given  priority?  The  menu  of possible
"problems"  of  street  crime  the  police  might  decide  to  address
includes:
1. Forms  of  particularly  harmful  violence  such  as  homicides,
rape,  or regular  intimidation  by  organized  crime,  gangs,  or
individuals;
2. All violence;
3. Activities  that create  fear  in many  people  or otherwise  dis-
courage  social  control,  such  as  the  disorder  coming  from
open-air  drug markets;
4. All forms of drug  trafficking;  or
5. The security  of property against even non-violent theft.
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Moreover, these and perhaps other categories of crime are more
or less important,  depending on the place,  time, and victims of the
crime.  So, the choice is among at least five categories of crime with
at least three variations of each.  In fact, after some discussion, one
might well want to increase  the number of choices to well beyond
these fifteen variations.
3.  Whose Views Should Priorities  Reflect?
With these reasonable contenders  for priority in policing, a criti-
cal question becomes:  whose views of the importance of each cate-
gory  should  control?  Again,  there  are  a number  of  alternatives.
Whatever  category the police leadership considers  most important
might be critical.  To set limits on acceptable  goals, we might want
to forbid  decisions that seem  intended  to favor or disfavor the in-
terests  of an identifiable  group  or class,  such as  failing to  investi-
gate  powerful  political  figures  or  concentrating  police  effort  in
wealthy neighborhoods and failing to provide adequate policing in
poor neighborhoods, or-a contentious issue-projecting the views
of the police,  without any popular basis  for the  choice,  as to such
issues as fear of crime  or what  suppressing disorder  requires.
A second  alternative  is the prioritization  of categories  of crime
according to whatever  the police think that the majority of the citi-
zens of the city want addressed, regardless of the views of the peo-
ple in the immediate  neighborhood  where  the problem exists  and
the policing is to occur.  A closely related alternative is that priority
should go to whatever problems the mayor wants  addressed, for he
or she  is the duly elected  supervisor  of the police.
Another alternative  is to give priority to whatever  problems the
police believe  the  people  in the particular  neighborhood want ad-
dressed.  This could  be  defined  in several different  ways: "the  re-
spectable leadership of the neighborhood"  (where the definition of
respectable  may  amount  to  police  selection of  acceptable  behav-
ior);  those  in  the  neighborhood  who  volunteer  to work  with  the
police; or the majority of residents  of the neighborhood,  although
there  is  generally  no  available  process  for  determining  majority
views in a neighborhood.
Some  of  these  ways  of  setting  priorities  are  more  democratic
than others, either in the effort by the police  to decide whose con-
cerns are to be valued or in the making of the actual choice by one
or  another  of different  groups.  But even  in the more  democratic
methods, deep problems lurk.  For example, the police may not be
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very good at  determining  the views  of the majority  of the public,
however we  define the relevant public.
As  always,  the  size  of the constituency  also  matters.  We  know
from  surveys  that  people  generally  believe  their  own  neighbor-
hoods to be far safer than they believe the entire city to be.'57  The
people outside a neighborhood  area  are thus more likely to be in-
fluenced by fear, even if exaggerated, and by the immense effect  of
rare but dramatic crimes as described by the media.  Neighborhood
majorities  are likely to have different attitudes than majorities  of a
far larger,  citywide jurisdiction.
Even if the decision is made to focus  on the views  of local com-
munities  that are  smaller  than  entire  cities,  the result  is  likely  to
depend on how one defines a neighborhood.  But the hardest prob-
lem  is  deciding  whose  views  matter.  The  fact  is  that  different
groups want  different things.  The  young and  the old  are  likely to
have  different  attitudes  toward  disorder.  Minorities  in  a  city  are
likely  to  have  different  attitudes  than  majorities.  Most  dramati-
cally,  the  problem  can  be illustrated  by  the question:  what value
should be given to the concerns  of rebellious  minority youth in an
urban slum?  Some have treated  this group  as entitled to concern;
others have regarded  this group as the object, not the beneficiary,
of policing.
In  sum,  problem-solving  policing,  whether  or  not  it  takes  its
goals  from  those  living  in  a  particular  neighborhood,  requires
choice  among a variety of goals.  Even assuming that the objective
is  to  choose  goals  democratically,  so  that the police  are  acting in
the  name  of those  affected  by  their  policing, there  is  no  agreed-
upon  definition of whose concerns  are to be valued, how they are
to be determined, and what is to be done when those affected have
inconsistent  concerns.
It may not be possible to resolve  these questions persuasively  in
terms of some political philosophy.  But it is certainly dangerous, in
terms of democratic values,  to leave these questions  unaddressed.
That  is a dangerous  characteristic  of the new  policing.
B.  The Risk of Misuse  of  Police  Powers
For  many  people,  the  police  represent  not  only  protection
against the predatory conduct of one's neighbor, but also  a source
of fear themselves.  The fear may be of brutality by the only legiti-
mate  armed  force  in  the  community or  of the  embarrassment  of
157.  COMMUNITY  SAFETY,  supra note  13,  at  18, 25.THE NEW POLICING
being treated, particularly  in public, without dignity  or respect  by
members  of an  organization that represents  the authority  and the
power  of the state.  Or the fear may be of intrusiveness into areas
of  privacy  that  one  prefers  to  reserve  for  oneself  and  intimates.
Because  of these fears, we have come to expect more from the po-
lice  than effectiveness  in pursuing even carefully  chosen  goals.
We expect, first, a concern about maintaining a healthy relation-
ship between the citizen and  the authority and power of the state;
in other words, a respect  for the liberty and privacy of individuals.
Second, we  demand an absence  of bias in the use of the powers  I
have described, for assertions of police authority and force that are
systematically  biased  against  a  racial,  religious,  or  ethnic  group
convey  a  powerful  message  of  second-class  citizenship.  Bias
against political  opponents of the police  or their political  supervi-
sors is also a terrible threat to a vital democracy.  We  expect, third
and  most broadly,  to  be  accorded  the  respect  that  a  citizen  de-
serves  in a citizen-ruled  democracy-respect  displayed  in the way
individuals  are  addressed  and  handled,  particularly  in  front  of
others.  To protect all these expectations, we depend  on the visibil-
ity and reviewability  of significant decisions  by police officers.
In some conflict with these three expectations,  the new policing,
in many of its manifestations, involves  tactics and strategies which
are likely to:  increase  the power of the state at the expense  of the
capacity of citizens to  avoid or resist that power; invite the use  of
discretion in ways that are more likely to reveal bias than the older
forms of policing;  and increase  the likelihood of particular  groups
of people  being  subjected to  embarrassment,  and  treated without
respect on the streets.  At the same time, the new forms of policing
almost are designed to be carried out beneath the radar of visibility
on which  accountability depends.  Thus,  there is  a price to be paid
for the great potential of the new  forms of policing, but the price
can be reduced  by carefully  addressing issues of accountability.
1.  Citizen and State: Civil Liberties
Consider the effect of the new policing on the efforts of the last
half-century  to control the relationship of the state  to the individ-
ual  and, in particular, of a police  officer to  a citizen.  The specific
fears during that period  focused on police  abuse  of the powers  to
search, arrest, and interrogate.  In the 1960s, the United States  Su-
preme Court insisted that all of these powers, even when exercised
by local  police  officers, must satisfy  specific conditions-probable
cause  or reasonable  suspicion  and the Miranda rules-or else  any
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evidence  flowing from the action  would be excluded  from trial.15 8
The assumption  was that there would be little incentive to  violate
the Court's rules  if the information  could  not be used  at trial.  A
somewhat more lenient standard was  sufficient  to justify  a stop or
frisk of an individual (reasonable and articulable  suspicion),'159 and
a  somewhat  stricter  standard  was  applicable  to  electronic
surveillance.
160
Because these standards required the police to show that, before
acting, they had evidence of a crime  (and since the focus of policing
was  on very  serious  crimes),  there  has been  practically  no  use  of
the Equal  Protection  Clause  to  guarantee  that  minorities  are not
treated  differently;  after  all,  citizens  could  not be  subject to  these
police  powers  at  all unless there was  an  adequate basis  to believe
they had committed what was generally  a serious crime.  And there
was  a  final  protection  of which  we  were  very  proud:  the  police
could  not arrest  or search  at  all if the  basis for that activity-the
definition  of the criminal conduct of which the police needed  evi-
dence-was  so  general  and  encompassing  in  its  coverage  or  so
vague in what it forbade that it left the police officer with the wid-
est discretion  in deciding whose  conduct and what conduct should
be made  the basis of arrest and, perhaps,  trial.'
61
It is true  and important  that these efforts  to limit the powers  of
the police and regulate  the relations between citizen and state in a
way that respects the primacy of the citizen were based on two sup-
positions  that were,  at least, shaky.  The  first was  that police  con-
duct  on  the  street  would  largely  be  motivated  by  the  desire  to
gather evidence for trial, and thus could be regulated by excluding
evidence obtained  in violation of the restrictions  on police behav-
158.  Mapp  v.  Ohio,  367  U.S.  643,  655  (1961).  The  later  Burger  and  Rehnquist
Courts hedged  the exclusionary  rules crafted by the Warren  Court in the  1960s.  For
example, evidence seized  in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rules
can be introduced  at trial to impeach  a defendant's testimony.  E.g.,  United States  v.
Havens, 446  U.S. 620 (1980)  (permitting impeachment  with evidence  seized in  viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment);  Harris v.  New York,  401 U.S. 222  (1971)  (permitting
impeachment  with a confession  obtained in  violation  of Miranda). Such evidence  is
also admissible  in  proceedings  outside the context of the  criminal  trial.  E.g.,  United
States  v.  Calandra,  414  U.S.  338  (1974)  (grand jury  proceedings);  United  States  v.
Janis, 428  U.S. 433  (1976)  (civil  tax proceedings).  The  Court  has reasoned  that the
rule of exclusion is grounded in a policy of deterrence, which  is satisfied by the exclu-
sion in the prosecution's case-in-chief, and  should not be applied  where principles of
deterrence will not be furthered.  E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80
(1978);  United  States v.  Leon,  468  U.S. 897,  906  (1984).
159.  United  States  v. Sokolow,  490 U.S.  1, 6  (1989).
160.  Katz  v.  United States, 389  U.S.  347,  354-59  (1967).
161.  Papachristou  v. City of Jacksonville,  405  U.S. 156,  162  (1972).
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ior.  Second, and equally important, the rules did not provide pro-
tection  against,  or  regulate  in  any  significant  way,  some  very
powerful  investigative  techniques:  informants;  grand jury powers
to  compel  testimony  prior  to  trial;  offers  by  police  to  engage  in
illegal transactions  in order  to develop  evidence;  various  types  of
physical surveillance;  a variety of techniques for eliciting "consent"
to a form of detention or search;  threats to prosecute an individual
who has committed a  crime in order to get evidence; and, perhaps
most dramatically, the constitutional power to arrest some individ-
uals, and not others, for minor offenses  in order to take advantage
of the power to search, within a limited area, in connection with an
arrest.162  Seeking greater freedom of action, a police officer or de-
partment  could  emphasize  these  unregulated  powers.  Even  the
regulated  powers  could  be  violated  without  much  fear  of conse-
quences  if the purpose was  not to suppress  evidence.
The  new  policing  is intended,  in many  instances,  to  greatly  in-
crease  the  effectiveness  of these  unregulated  powers  and  to  find
ways to avoid judicial enforcement by the exclusionary rule of even
such regulated powers  as stop and frisk.  Findings by  the attorney
general  of the State  of New York suggest  that there has not been
an adequate effort by the New York police to restrict frisks or stops
to  the situations  where  the  Constitution permits them.163  The  re-
sult of many tens of thousands of such stops has undoubtedly been
a sizeable  reduction in the carrying  of guns  and thereby  of homi-
cides, but there is  a price for abandoning  this part of the system of
accountability  for  detentions  and  searches.  A  rapid  increase  in
misdemeanor  arrests or the use of a variety of other formal or in-
formal sanctions  in situations  where the average  citizen would not
be  subjected  to  that  police  power  recreates  the  very  capacity  to
target  specific  individuals,  gangs  and  other  groups-particularly
minority  youth-that  the  Supreme  Court  had  tried  to  forbid  by
outlawing the use of vague  statutes.
In a number of situations  in a number of cities, a major compo-
nent of the new policing strategy is to rely more and more on that
set of police powers  that are substantially unregulated  by law  and
to take  advantage  of the  inability of courts  to hold  the police  ac-
countable by recourse to the exclusion of evidence-all in order to
162.  United  States  v. Robinson, 414  U.S. 218,  226  (1973).
163.  CIVIL  RIGHTS  BUREAU,  OFFICE OF  THE  ATTORNEY  GEN.  OF THE  STATE  OF
N.Y., THE NEW  YORK  CITY  POLICE DEPARTMENT'S  "STOP  & FRISK"  PRACTICES:  A
REPORT  TO  THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE  STATE  OF  NEW  YORK  FROM  THE  OFFICE  OF THE
ATTORNEY  GENERAL,  69-72, 160-74  (Dec. 1,  1999)  [hereinafter  OAG REPORT].
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focus unreviewable  police discretion on those forms of conduct and
those individuals that the police somehow determine are most dan-
gerous.  This conscious use of the weaknesses in the control  system
built up since  1950 has had dramatic and beneficial results  in han-
dling crime,  but not without significant risks of changing  the rela-
tionship of the citizen to the state, and  of the police to individuals
on the  street.  It may well  be that most people  in  most  neighbor-
hoods  regard  the  tradeoff  as  highly  favorable  to  the  new  polic-
ing.  It  is nonetheless  dangerous  to democratic  values.
2.  Equal Protection: Civil Rights
There  has been only extremely  rare use of the Equal Protection
Clause to regulate police conduct, on the theory that important in-
trusions such  as arrest and search are adequately  regulated by the
requirements  of probable  cause  and  that  minor  intrusions, which
have not been regulated by the  Constitution or statute, hardly de-
serve special  attention.  But the second  part  of this judgment  has
proven  to  be  inadequate  in  a  number  of  ways.  Stopping  more
blacks and  Hispanics than non-Hispanic  whites  either without the
justification of reasonable suspicion or with the justification of hav-
ing  observed  a  violation  of the  law-albeit  one  that  is  generally
ignored in the case  of others-may  have relatively  minor immedi-
ate  effects  on  an  individual,  but  immense  importance  in  what  it
says about the place of black or Hispanic Americans in society and
in terms of the felt reality of the promise of equal protection of the
laws that they have  been given  by  the U.S. Constitution.  Moreo-
ver, it may be the embarrassment  and resentment of being singled
out as a suspect, far more than the intrusion on one's privacy, that
needs  protection, as  Chief Justice  Earl Warren recognized  in writ-
ing  the  opinion  in  Terry v.  Ohio sustaining stop  and  frisk.165  Fi-
nally,  what  may  be  a  minor  intrusion,  if  it  occurs  on  a  single
occasion, may be a major problem if it occurs regularly  enough to
fuel the fears and affect  the conduct of members of a suspect class
(for example,  minority youth in  a high-crime  area).
Beyond  the costs  of these largely  unreviewable  uses of powers
against those  the police  believe, often  correctly, to be more likely
to be engaged in a particular type of crime, there  is the problem of
spillover  to  clear  violations  of  the  rules  with  respect  to  arrest,
search,  or  interrogation.  The  brutality  and  excessive  force  dis-
164.  Tracey L. Meares  & Dan M.  Kahan, Laws and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 L. & Soc'y  REV.  805,  830  (1998).
165.  Terry v.  Ohio, 392  U.S. 1, 15,  24-26  (1968).
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played  in  the  Abner  Louima  and  Amadou  Diallo  cases  in  New
York City bolster African Americans'  sense of insecurity, as well as
their  reluctance  to  enjoy  the  basic  civil  liberties  accorded  to  all
citizens.'66
To the extent that the new policing encourages  the police to fo-
cus investigative attention on the earliest signs of criminal behavior
or even on disorder alone, it invites using even weak evidence  as a
basis  for  finding  reasonable  suspicion  and  for  the  invocation  of
powers that do  not ordinarily  require  any justification  or  form of
accountability.  Thus,  a review  by New York State  Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer of 175,000 forms detailing stop and  frisk activity
in New  York  City showed  that  even  police  records  reflect  about
nine  stops  of blacks  and  Hispanics  and  eight  stops  of whites  for
each  resulting  arrest. 167  In its focus  on problem-solving,  the  new
policing also emphasizes  the steps that can be taken against an in-
dividual without any individualized basis in fact.  A common exam-
ple is stopping  a driver and searching his or her car for drugs under
the pretext of concern that the car's taillight is not working or that
its  speed  is  excessive  and that  the  car  is  thus  being  operated  in
violation  of a  local ordinance.  Such  forms  of policing  allow  and
encourage  the use of guesses and probabilities that are far less de-
pendent on evidence,  compared to what  has traditionally been re-
quired  for a stop,  an arrest, or a search to gather information.
Weaker requirements of justification for police action  almost in-
variably  invite  more  bias.  The  Spitzer  study  showed  that  "even
when crime  is accounted for statistically, minorities still were being
'stopped'  at  a  higher  rate  than  whites;"  blacks  were  23%  more
likely and Hispanics  39%  more likely than white non-Hispanics  to
be  stopped  by police.168  Generalizations  about the  greater  likeli-
hood that a particular group will be involved  in a particular crimi-
nal  activity, such  as dealing crack  cocaine,  are now more  likely to
be made the basis for substantial disparities in treatment than they
were before strategic emphasis was put on the unregulated areas of
police  conduct.169  Then, even if members  of a hypothetical  group
166.  See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine  Harden,  The Louima Case: The Overview-Of-
ficer is Guilty in  Torture of Louima, N.Y.  TIMES,  June  9,  1999,  at Al; see also Jane
Fritsch,  The Diallo Verdict: The Overview-4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquit-
ted of All Charges, N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb. 26, 2000,  at Al.
167.  OAG  REPORT, supra note  163,  at 111.
168.  Id. at  119,  123.
169.  E.g.,  Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, L.A. TIMES,
May  21,  1995,  at Al  (reporting  that evidence  in  southern California  and  throughout
the U.S. indicates that the vast majority of crack offenders  prosecuted in federal court
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X were more likely than others to be selling crack cocaine, the like-
lihood of any particular  member  of X being  engaged  in that con-
duct is generally  so small that it could not satisfy probable cause or
reasonable  suspicion  standards.
Questioning  someone  (for example,  a Hispanic youth) on a cor-
ner in  a  way  that  suggests  he  is not  free to  leave,  which  the  Su-
preme Court has allowed, 7° or searching  a car, or making a street
stop of a pedestrian are  all likely to  be based, to some extent,  on
the racial or ethnic characteristics that the police believe  more fre-
quently accompany crimes of concern. 171  A focus on types of dan-
gerous or criminal behavior, rather than on the behavior of specific
individuals,  invites these generalizations.  It is  also  at the heart of
much of the new policing.  It is  in this context  that we  should un-
derstand the debate  about racial  profiling.
3.  Respect and Civility
Sara Stoutland  argues, on the basis of an ethnographic  study of
the  reactions of youth and  their older family members  in Boston,
that  neighborhoods  subjected  to  the  new  policing  in  Boston  are
pleased  with  the  safety  it  has provided  but  concerned  about the
absence  of respect  shown to  the citizens  it confronts. 72  One  also
can detect this disparity in the review of attitudes towards policing
in New York and Chicago.
This issue is related to, but different from, concerns  about equal
protection and legally defined civil liberties.  An absence of respect
may be the source of much of the offense  given by a failure to treat
certain  stigmatized  groups  of citizens  equally  with  other  groups;
but the issue of respect is broader and is applicable to police inter-
actions with any group of citizens.  The difference  in treatment be-
tween groups  may  be attributable  to differences  in political clout,
as the influence  of one group may elicit respectful handling by the
police while  the absence of such influence  may invite less respect-
ful  relations  for  the other.  Ethnic  or racial  bias may  not  be  the
are non-white  people), cited by Symposium, Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are There
Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB.  L.J. 3, 79-83  (2000)  (discussing the  disproportionate
impact on African Americans and Hispanics  of the disparity in length of prison terms
imposed for crack cocaine offenses  versus those imposed for powder cocaine offenses
for  like  amounts of those drugs).
170.  E.g.,  Florida  v.  Bostick,  501  U.S.  429  (1991);  Florida  v.  Royer, 460  U.S. 491
(1983);  United States  v.  Mendenhall,  446  U.S.  544  (1980).
171.  United States  v.  Weaver,  966 F.2d  391,  394  (8th  Cir. 1992).
172.  Sara  Stoutland,  Trust,  Legitimacy,  and  Efforts  to  Reduce  Youth  Violent
Crime: Community Perspectives from Boston 26 (March 1, 2000) (unpublished  manu-
script, on file  with author).THE NEW POLICING
issue.  An  absence  of respect  also  often  reflects  a  sense  that  the
individual is without rights against the state.  But here, too, there is
a difference.  An officer making  a stop and then  frisking  a citizen
on a crowded  street may  be acting  well within  the parameters  of
reasonable suspicion that the law imposes, yet the way the stop  is
made may  convey humiliating  contempt for the suspect.
It  is  becoming  very  clear  that  the  cause  of  much  violence  by
youth against  other youth  is  a  sense  of being  treated  without  re-
spect.  The resulting  attack is a distorted form of insistence  on be-
ing treated  with dignity and as an important person.  Distinguished
police commissioners,  such as Commissioner Evans in Boston, con-
tend that even forcible encounters like a stop or arrest can, in most
cases, be  handled in a  way that reflects  respect for the suspect.1 7 3
Police officers  in the housing projects of Chicago  report  that they
can  make  arrests  without  danger  to  themselves  or others  if they
treat the suspect with respect.174  All these beliefs are practical  rea-
sons, from the point of view of law enforcement, for insisting on at
least the appearance of a respectful attitude toward those who are
confronted  with real or apparent  powers  of the police.
The  issue is at least equally important from the point  of view of
many law-abiding residents in a neighborhood for whom a continu-
ing question  is whether the police are there to support them or to
protect people in other areas from them or their children.  Citizens
who  feel themselves  and  their children  the  object  of policing  in-
tended to protect others and who feel that the steps taken reflect a
lack of respect for them as citizens and individuals are made to feel
like second-class  citizens, used  rather than  valued.  They  are  also
taught to fear the police rather than to value their  services, an atti-
tude  that creates sympathy for youth in revolt  and  frustration for
their elders who need protection  but insist on respect.
Some significant forms of the new policing  involve  dealing with
individuals  through implicit coercion.  In New York, signaling that
it is the  police who  control the  streets  by zero  tolerance  policing,
claiming  to  decide  what  is  acceptable  conduct  and what  is  disor-
derly  behavior,  and  gathering  information  by  "leaning  on"  those
who are vulnerable  to revocation  of parole or probation-all  these
173.  First  Safety, Then Civility: Boston and New  York,  ECONOMIST,  May  1, 1999, at
25 (citing  Commissioner Evans'  statement  that many of the problems associated  with
the  stop and  search of suspects  disappear when  "there  is mutual  respect"  and  "the
police  explain  why the  search  is being  done").
174.  E.g.,  Jerry Lawrence,  Officers'  Class Focused on Race Relations, CHI.  TRIB.,
June  19,  2000,  at  1 (describing  a seminar  offered  by  a  former police  officer  on the
need to treat  citizens, especially  racial  and ethnic  minorities, with  respect).
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may  be  extremely  useful  steps  in creating  security  but extremely
costly  in denying  respect.  In Boston, the gathering of information
by  relatively  coercive  questioning  on the  streets,  accompanied  by
conveying  some notion of the power of computerized  retrieval  of
such information, can have the same beneficial and harmful effects.
All these activities are  designed to take place beneath the radar
of judicial review,  another consequence  that Chief Justice  Warren
anticipated  when  reviewing powers  to stop  and frisk.  The  effects
on the citizens in the neighborhood  and on their attitudes towards
the police  are captured  in the statistical assessments  of policing in
Chicago  and New York. 75
4.  The  Task of the Future: Maintaining  the Security Advantages
of the New  Policing while Reducing its Risks to  Civil Liberties
There is every reason to believe that the great majority of people
in almost every city and the clear majority of those in the neighbor-
hoods most threatened  by both insecurity  and the risks to civil lib-
erties would, if forced to choose, prefer the new forms  of policing.
The  advantages  of  personal  security  are  that  great.  Indeed,  as
noted above,  a majority of the residents  of some Chicago  housing
projects were prepared to give up their right to refuse to have their
apartments  searched  without  probable  cause  in  the  interests  of
greater  personal  security.
176
But the choice should not be so stark.  Uses of discretion that are
beneath the level  of visibility to courts could be the subject of de-
partmental  regulation.  The  reliance  on the exclusionary  rule  as a
primary  sanction  need  not mean that it  is the  exclusive  sanction.
What we need, in short, is a regulatory system with other sanctions
and new rules.  We must find ways to have  both civil liberties and
security.
Consider some examples of new forms  of regulation.  The prob-
lem of changed relationships between the citizen  and the state, be-
tween  the  resident  and  the police  officer,  could  be  addressed,  in
part, by requiring the police  to make clear when they are asserting
authority  and  when  they are  simply  making  a request  to  stop  or
submit to  a search.  The  Supreme  Court has ruled that this is not
required  by the Constitution.177  But the practice  of taking advan-
tage  of  a  citizen's  ignorance  of  constitutional  rights  or  his  un-
175.  Supra Part II.A.3.
176.  See Meares  & Kahan, supra note  12.
177.  Florida v. Bostick,  501  U.S.  429  (1991);  Schneckloth  v.  Bustamonte,  412 U.S.
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founded fears remains subject to political review and it is unwise in
light  of an  increasing  emphasis  on  control of  the streets  and  the
gathering of information by informal means.  Efforts to keep track
of the percentage  of black, Hispanic, and white, non-Hispanic driv-
ers  of cars  that are  stopped  and  to  make  those  figures  available
publicly are regulatory steps that can have major consequences  on
a sense  of discrimination.178  Keeping track  of the number of com-
plaints  against  any  officer  for  disrespectful  behavior  can  be  an
important step in encouraging respect, particularly if it is accompa-
nied by appropriate  remedial training.
Most  rules  require  some  sanctions  if they are  to be  taken seri-
ously.  For behavior that is not generally designed to elicit evidence
for criminal  trials-the situation  with regard  to much  of the  new
policing-the  exclusionary  rule  is plainly  an inadequate  sanction.
Nor is there much promise  in the form of civil  lawsuits, which are
likely to be much too costly for remedying the risks to civil liberties
in the multitude of low visibility occurrences  that are at issue.  Ad-
ministrative discipline under rules that are more manageable is one
likely  solution.
Regulatory schemes  require  credibility  and  credibility  often re-
quires  some form of external  oversight, not of individual  adminis-
trative determinations but of the adequacy of the functioning of the
administrative  system,  as New  York's  "Mollen  Commission"  sug-
gested some years ago.179  In the past decade, independent partner-
ships like that between the Boston Police Department and the Ten
Point Coalition have benefited both the organizations  and  the city
as a whole.  By blending  criticism with approval,  the Coalition has
helped  cultivate  the police programs  that are responsible for Bos-
ton's remarkable  success.  Significantly,  the  fruits  of this effort-
the drop  in youth homicide,  drug use, and  overall crime-are  no-
where  more  apparent  than  on  the  streets  of  Dorchester  and
Roxbury, where furor over  police abuse  first erupted.
Relationships like this one help fill the void left by the erosion of
judicial oversight.  They are, however, comparatively rare.  An un-
fortunate  series of events, coupled  with an unprecedented  willing-
178.  Police Tactics in  Question: 'Stop and Frisk' in New York,  N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 4,
1999,  at A16.
179.  CITY  OF N.Y.  COMM'N  TO  INVESTIGATE  ALLEGATIONS  OF  POLICE  CORRUP-
TION  &  THE  ANTI-CORRUPTION  PROCEDURES  OF  THE  POLICE  DEP'T,  REPORT  OF
NEW  YORK  COMMISSION  TO  INVESTIGATE  ALLEGATIONS  OF  POLICE  CORRUPTION
AND  THE ANTI-CORRUPTION  PROCEDURES  OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT  (1994).  The
Commission is popularly known as the "Mollen  Commission,"  after its chair, the Hon.
Milton  Mollen.
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ness by Boston's police chiefs and black ministers to work together,
brought  about this unlikely partnership.  Its enduring nature  testi-
fies to their commitment and mutual dependence.  As in other cit-
ies,  there  are  still  tensions  between  officers  and  the  minority
residents whom the Coalition represents.  This friction assures each
organization's  independence.  What remains to be seen  is whether
cities  like  New  York,  in  the  wake  of outrage  over  assaults  like
those  on  Abner  Louima  and  Amadou  Diallo,  will  be  willing  to
reach out as Boston did following the Carol Stuart murder and the
stop  and frisk scandal  in the early  1990s.
These suggestions  are meant to be  illustrative, and they are  far
from  comprehensive.  The  central  idea  is  that  new  rules  are  re-
quired to regulate  the new policing and that these cannot take the
form of judicial review of the admissibility of evidence.  They prob-
ably cannot depend  primarily on any form of judicial sanctions for
violations  of the  rules,  both  because  the  rules  will  be  developed
administratively  and because  they will  regulate  forms of behavior
that have long been considered too subtle to justify judicial review.
What we need is the acceptance  of new forms of responsibility  for
civil liberties by police agencies involved in the forms  of new polic-
ing.  Credible  oversight  must  involve  those  outside  of the  police
but it should be of processes  and structures, not of individual cases.